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The Walking Dead: How the Criminal 
Regulation of Sodomy Survived Lawrence v. 
Texas 
Jordan Carr Peterson* 
ABSTRACT 
Eighteen years after the Supreme Court held in Lawrence v. Texas that a 
law criminalizing sodomy violated the constitutional guarantee to substantive 
due process, individuals are still arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and 
incarcerated pursuant to statutes that are the material equivalent of the one at 
issue in Lawrence.  Though this seems both strange and unfair, it is neither 
unusual nor accidental.  Because the constitutional order renders the judiciary 
a passive institution and radically fragments authority across a polycentric 
collection of governments, noncompliance with judicial decisions is endemic to 
American institutional design. 
While the Lawrence decision cast unflagging constitutional disapproval on 
statutes criminalizing private, consensual, nonprocreative intercourse, multiple 
states continue to enforce criminal prohibitions on sodomy on the theory that 
Lawrence only proscribes inequitable applications of categorical sodomy bans, 
as opposed to leaving them unenforceable entirely.  This Article thus represents 
the first comprehensive examination of how criminal prohibitions on sodomy 
have stubbornly survived their own intended death. 
States enforce laws criminalizing sodomy through both direct prosecution 
as well as collateral means, namely, by requiring individuals convicted under 
bans on consensual sodomy to register as sex offenders.  This Article maintains 
that a faithful reading of Lawrence demands the wholesale abandonment of laws 
facially criminalizing private, consensual sexual intimacy, and recommends the 
legislative repeal of programs enabling both direct and collateral enforcement 
of categorical prohibitions on sodomy. 
 
*Jordan Carr Peterson, Assistant Professor of Political Science, School of Public and 
International Affairs, North Carolina State University; Ph.D., University of Southern 
California (2018); J.D., University of Florida Levin College of Law (2012). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“This case thus requires us to decide when the threat of 
continued enforcement is enough to reanimate a zombie law and 
bring it from the statutory graveyard into federal court.” – Pool 
v. City of Houston1 
How do laws die?  The simplest answer is legislative repeal; if 
sufficient majorities in a legislative body agree, existing statutes may be 
excised from their jurisdiction’s code by subsequently enacting a repeal 
bill.2  The less simple answer is negative judicial review.  American courts 
famously have the authority – of, some argue, extraconstitutional 
provenance3 – to proscribe the enforcement of laws, policies, and practices 
enacted or implemented by coordinate public institutions if the reviewing 
court deems such actions unconstitutional.4 The power to repeal affords 
legislatures the capacity to eliminate laws they disfavor rapidly, while 
judicial review sounds a more protracted death knell for unconstitutional 
 
1 Pool v. City of Houston, 978 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2020). 
2 See, e.g., Jordan M. Ragusa & Nathaniel A. Birkhead, Parties, Preferences, 
and Congressional Organization: Explaining Repeals in Congress from 1877 to 2012, 
68 POL. RES. Q. 745 (2015) (examining congressional repeals of major legislation and 
arguing that legislative repeal is more likely given greater agenda control by 
legislative majorities and when a party has been in the minority for longer); 
Christopher R. Berry, Barry C. Burden & William G. Howell, After Enactment: The 
Lives and Deaths of Federal Programs, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1 (2010) (concluding that 
variation in the partisan composition of Congress influences the durability of federal 
policy programs); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A 
Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665 (2002) (assessing the maxim that current legislatures 
may not bind future legislatures from enacting policies the current legislature 
disfavors, including but not limited to repealing the current legislature’s own 
legislation). 
3 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (arguing that the framers did not intend federal 
courts to have the power of judicial review whatsoever); but see SYLVIA SNOWISS, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990) (suggesting the 
ratifying generation intended to grant courts the power of judicial review but that their 
aim was for such ability to be seldom exercised); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ 
Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1128–46 (1987) (contending that the 
original understanding of the American political order permitted judicial invalidation 
of legislative enactments not only on constitutional grounds, but also based on a host 
of other moral and ethical principles). 
4 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). While the conventional 
wisdom and much scholarship suggests Marbury was the first instance of judicial 
review by the Supreme Court, more recent research suggests a more robust tradition 
of judicial review in the pre–Marbury early republic. William Michael Treanor, 
Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005). 
3
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laws and policies because court decisions are not self-executing.5  To wit, 
although American courts enjoy expansive prerogative to participate in 
forming public policy by passing constitutional judgment on legislative or 
regulatory decisions, they lack the ability to ensure officials and 
institutions will adhere to their commands.6  Consequently, though a 
judicial pronouncement that a given statute or class of statutes facially 
violates the Constitution likely spells the functional end for the laws in 
question, the peculiarities of American institutional design furnish them 
with an escape hatch to a fruitful afterlife. 
In 2003, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Lawrence v. 
Texas that a Texas statute imposing criminal prohibitions on individuals 
who engage in same-sex sexual intimacy violated the substantive 
guarantees of due process by infringing on individuals’ constitutional 
rights to liberty and privacy.7  The decision engendered, however, neither 
the automatic repeal of state statutes criminalizing sodomy at the time 
Lawrence was decided, nor the cessation of police, prosecutorial, and 
administrative practices enforcing criminal prohibitions on sodomy.8 
While several state legislatures formally repealed their sodomy bans after 
Lawrence, this decision was not immediate.9  Even now in some states that 
elected not to repeal their statutes criminally prohibiting sodomy after 
Lawrence, the imposition of criminal sanctions and administrative burdens 
pursuant to sodomy bans proceeds apace. These practices continue as 
some courts postulate that Lawrence only constrains the application of 
blanket prohibitions on sodomy to private, consensual sex, rather than 
enjoining the enforcement of such statutes altogether.10  Any hope, then, 
that Lawrence would instantaneously render statutes criminalizing private, 
consensual sexual conduct inoperable – what I call the mirage of automatic 
invalidation – proves quixotic.11 
 
5 See, e.g., Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act § 101, S.900, 106th Congress § 1 
(deregulating certain business practices for financial institutions by explicitly 
repealing sections 20 and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, commonly known as the 
Glass–Steagall Act). In contrast to repeal legislation, it may take months or even years 
for negative judicial review to have the court’s intended effect on presumably 
unconstitutional practices. See Josh Blackman, The Irrepressible Myth of Cooper v. 
Aaron, 107 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1140–53 (2019) (detailing the complicated 
implementation process of school desegregation in the years after the remedial holding 
in Brown v. Board of Education II requiring desegregation with “all deliberate 
speed”). 
6 See infra Part II–A. 
7 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
8 See infra Parts II–C and II–D. 
9 See infra Part II–B. 
10 See infra Parts II–C and II–D. 
11 See infra Part II–A. The phenomenon I describe as the mirage of automatic 
invalidation is similar to what Jonathan Mitchell has elsewhere called the “writ–of–
erasure fallacy,” in reference to the tendency to equate the power of judicial review 
4
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This Article analyzes the legal means through which the criminal 
regulation of sodomy has survived its own intended death at the hands of 
the Supreme Court and contends that the survival of sodomy bans is 
enabled by both linguistic imprecision in the Lawrence decision along 
with the decentralized structure of American government.  Part I traces the 
history of criminal prohibitions on consensual sexual behavior in the 
United States, and reads the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence, for 
all its promise, as vivifying the afterlife of criminal prohibitions on 
sodomy.  Part II examines the state of sodomy laws after Lawrence, and 
details how police, prosecutors, and judges offend the substantive thrust 
of that decision through the continued deprivation of rights and liberties 
pursuant to statutes that, on their face, violate the Lawrence rule. Part III 
offers remedial suggestions for legislative and judicial officials to bring 
policy in their jurisdiction into harmony with the letter and spirit of 
Lawrence. Part IV concludes by recommending legislation that clearly 
proscribes both the direct and collateral enforcement of sodomy bans. 
II. THE REGULATION OF CONSENSUAL SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
A. Laws Criminalizing Sodomy: A Brief History 
Certain classes of sexual conduct (whether engaged in publicly or 
privately) have been regulated as “crimes against nature” in the United 
States and its colonial predecessors in British North America since the 
eighteenth century.12  Indeed, the early Puritan settlers in New England – 
 
with an absolute judicial veto on legislation. Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ–of–
Erasure Fallacy, 104 VA. L. REV. 933, 951–69 (2018). Whereas Mitchell’s important 
research concentrates specifically on correcting the fallacious assumption that judicial 
decisions constitutionally disapproving of statutes and preliminary injunctions 
forbidding the enforcement of a law erase statutes or suspend their application, as well 
as identifying the consequences of the fallacy, I examine in detail the procedural 
mechanisms by which public officials have been able to evade compliance with the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence. See id. 
12 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY 
LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861–2003 (2008) (tracing the history of sodomy regulations in 
the United States over time and arguing that reform of statutes prohibiting sodomy 
was encumbered by the fragmentation of authority in American government). The first 
known anti–sodomy statute in the present-day United States appeared nearly as early 
as possible after the establishment of permanent British settlements in North America, 
as sodomy – along with rape and adultery – was prohibited as a capital offense by the 
colonial code of Virginia enacted in 1610. Id. at 17. Over time, statutes banning 
nonprocreative intercourse have gone by different names. Historically, “crime against 
nature” was the most common designation, and crime against nature statutes typically 
were understood (though did not explicitly enumerate as much) to ban sodomy and 
5
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a group notorious for its willingness to express moral reprobation – have 
been said to have “reserved their strongest condemnations for sodomy.”13  
These prohibitions, however, were neither English nor Puritan 
innovations, instead tracing their ancestry as so many prohibitions do to 
the expansive universe of behavioral regulations in the Levitical code.14  
While seemingly convinced that crimes against nature advanced any 
number of moral interests, legislators responsible for drafting these early 
prohibitive statutes predominantly failed to specify with much precision 
which sexual behaviors qualified as crimes against nature.15  These 
imprecisions, in turn, afforded courts substantial latitude in exactly which 
nonprocreative sexual activities statutorily qualified for prohibition.16   
At some point in its history, every U.S. state has imposed criminal 
prohibitions on some array of sexual practices legally characterizable as 
sodomy, even if such acts occurred between consenting adults.17  Though 
statutes regulating so-called crimes against nature originally applied only 
to anal intercourse and bestiality, by the end of the nineteenth century 
some state legislatures began to alter their criminal codes to include 
fellatio in their statutory definition of sodomy.18  In those states whose 
legislators did nothing to amend the relevant statutes to criminalize oral 
 
bestiality. In more recently drafted statutes, sodomy is named as the offense. See 
generally id. 
13 GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION: SEX, RELIGION, AND LAW 
FROM AMERICA’S ORIGINS TO THE TWENTY–FIRST CENTURY 78 (2017). 
14 Henry F. Fradella, Legal, Moral, and Social Reasons for Decriminalizing 
Sodomy, 18 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 279, 280. Early Judaic law was rather unlike its 
ancient Greek and Roman contemporaries in its condemnation of sodomy, but the 
spread of Christianity throughout Europe over the course of the last millennium 
encouraged the regulation of sexual behavior as both an ecclesiastical as well as a 
legal matter. Id. at 281. 
15 ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 12, at 2–3. Social scientists 
and philosophers posit that a variety of human psychological impulses provide 
sufficient enabling conditions for the enactment of sodomy regulations. For instance, 
social psychologists have found that the emotion of disgust is strongly associated with 
homophobic attitudes, suggesting that disgust at nontraditional sexual behavior likely 
also motivates criminalizing homosexual intimacy. See Bunmi O. Olatunji, Disgust, 
scrupulosity, and conservative attitudes about sex: Evidence for a mediational model 
of homophobia, 42 J. RES. PERSONALITY 1364 (2008). Likewise, scholars have noted 
that the judicial and legislative construction of sexually nonconforming practices as 
socially undesirable may be driven by the construction of a narrative that associates 
sexual nonconformity with predation. Larry Cata Backer, Constructing a 
“Homosexual” for Constitutional Theory: Sodomy Narrative, Jurisprudence, and 
Antipathy in United States and British Courts, 71 TUL L. REV. 529, 554–67 (1996). 
16 ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 12, at 2–3. 
17 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. 
Texas, 593 U.S. 558 (2003); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE 
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 328–37 (1999). 
18 ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 12, at 2, 50–51. 
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intercourse explicitly, entrepreneurial judges and law enforcement officers 
began to interpret extant prohibitions on crimes against nature as 
proscribing fellatio.19  As the United States population – and particularly 
its gay male population – grew increasingly urban over the course of the 
twentieth century, the number of arrests for sodomy rose drastically.20  
Recognizing that it represented a serious logistical difficulty for law 
enforcement officers to apprehend violators of crime against nature laws 
in flagrante delicto,21 jurisdictions increasingly employed criminal 
prohibitions on the solicitation of sodomy as well as “degeneracy” to target 
both male and female sex workers for surveillance and harassment.22  After 
the Stonewall uprising in 1969, and as social and political inequities 
experienced by the gay community came into somewhat sharper relief, 
enforcement of sodomy prohibitions in many major cities became less 
vigorous.23  Whereas prior to Stonewall only Illinois had ceased to impose 
criminal sanctions for sodomy as a matter of state law, in the decade 
following the uprising sodomy was decriminalized by a further twenty-
one states.24 Nevertheless, by the 1980s, sodomy remained criminally 
punishable in about half of U.S. states, and – as Bowers v. Hardwick would 
demonstrate – statutes criminalizing sodomy continued to form the legal 
basis for deprivations of liberty as a result of adults engaging in private, 
consensual sexual behavior.25 
 
19 Id. at 51. With some regularity, the legal incorporation of fellatio (and, though 
less frequently, cunnilingus) into the acts prohibited by crime against nature statutes 
proceeded by functionally equating anal and oral sex by grouping them together 
conceptually as forms of nonprocreative sexual activity. Id. at 51–53. 
20 Id. at 57. 
21 This term refers to catching an individual in the act of committing a crime, 
and is used with particular frequency to refer to the commission of illegal sex acts. 
22 Id. at 57–59. 
23 Id. at 166–72; Robert O. Self, Sex in the City: The Politics of Sexual 
Liberalism in Los Angeles, 1963–79, 20 GENDER & HISTORY 288 (2008). 
24 Melinda D. Kane, Social Movement Policy Success: Decriminalizing State 
Sodomy Laws, 1969–1998, 8 MOBILIZATION: AN INT’L Q. 313 (2003). By 1979, 
sodomy was decriminalized in Connecticut, Colorado, Oregon, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Ohio, New Hampshire, North Dakota, California, Maine, New Mexico, Washington, 
Indiana, Iowa, South Dakota, West Virginia, Nebraska, Vermont, Wyoming, Alaska, 
and New Jersey, following the initial decriminalization by Illinois in 1961. Id. at 315. 
Other states decriminalized on a discriminatory basis: by the time that Bowers v. 
Hardwick was decided in 1986, sodomy was decriminalized for different–sex but not 
same–sex partners in Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, and 
Texas. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 17, at 150. 
25 Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching 
for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988). 
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B. The Affirmation of Sodomy Regulations in Bowers v. Hardwick 
Because many states continued to impose criminal sanctions for 
sodomy well into the 1980s, a coalition of advocacy organizations joined 
lead counsel Laurence Tribe in a facial challenge to the constitutionality 
of Georgia’s sodomy statute that was heard before the Supreme Court in 
1986.26  In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court held that the Georgia 
law criminalizing sodomy did not violate respondent Hardwick’s 
constitutional right to privacy as the Constitution does not confer “a 
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”27 Employing 
rational basis review, Justice White, writing for the majority, emphatically 
rejected the notion that extant privacy jurisprudence stood “for the 
proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting 
adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription.”28 By 
construing the legal question much more narrowly than the Eleventh 
Circuit – which ruled in favor of Hardwick – the majority conceptually 
demarcated the conduct rendered criminally punishable by the Georgia 
sodomy law as meaningfully different from the sorts of intimate behavior 
protected by the constitutional right to privacy.29 
In holding that consensual, same-sex sexual activity between adults 
was not protected as a fundamental right under substantive due process,30 
the Court declined to extend the same sort of privacy-oriented 
constitutional protections as they previously had to activities including, 
but not limited to, nonprocreative marital intercourse,31 nonprocreative 
vaginal intercourse outside of marriage,32 and abortion.33  The Court in 
Bowers found its limiting principle by purporting to interpret prior 
jurisprudence that protected these other, sufficiently fundamental rights as 
representing only the notion that individuals enjoy “a fundamental 
individual right to decide whether or not to beget or bear a child,” 
conveniently disqualifying same-sex intimacy from any constitutional 
 
26 Gerard V. Bradley, Remaking the Constitution: A Critical Reexamination of 
the Bowers v. Hardwick Dissent, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 501, 503 (1990). Among 
others, the amici included the National Gay Rights Advocates, the National 
Organization for Women, the American Psychological Association, the Presbyterian 
Church USA, and the attorneys general of New York and California. Id 
27 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. 
Texas, 593 U.S. 558 (2003). 
28 Id. at 191. 
29 Id. at 190–92. 
30 See Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N. C. L. REV. 
359, 362 (2001). 
31 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
32 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
33 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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safeguard.34  In addition to its doctrinal argument, the Bowers majority 
demonstrated an originalist conception of the Fourteenth Amendment.35 
The Court offered the numerous state-level criminal prohibitions on 
sodomy in existence at the time of the Amendment’s ratification as 
supporting justification for refusing to bring sexual intimacy between 
consenting adults of the same sex within the ambit of the Amendment’s 
protection.36  For nearly two decades afterward, Bowers controlled federal 
constitutional questions on statutes criminalizing sodomy, though both 
state courts of last resort as well as state legislatures proceeded to revise 
laws governing consensual, nonprocreative sexual behavior through the 
1990s and early 2000s.37 
C. Lawrence v. Texas and the Promise of Deregulating Consensual 
Sexual Behavior 
By 2003, fourteen U.S. states still had criminal prohibitions for 
sodomy on their books.38  The Supreme Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of these remaining bans by granting certiorari to two 
individuals convicted of violating a Texas statute that provides “[a] person 
commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with 
another individual of the same sex,”39 where deviate sexual intercourse is 
defined as “any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and 
the mouth or anus of another person; or the penetration of the genitals or 
 
34 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. Scholars have criticized the Bowers decision’s 
reading of relevant precedent for not recognizing a right to bodily integrity outside of 
pregnancy as well as for positing that earlier cases foreclosed the possibility of a 
constitutional right to consensual intimacy between adults. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra 
note 17 at 156; Donald H. J. Hermann, Pulling the Fig Leaf off the Right to Privacy, 
54 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 936 (2005). Likewise, it is not unlikely that antagonism 
toward gay individuals, or at least gay sex, animated the majority in Bowers – which 
called Hardwick’s constitutional claims “at best, facetious.” Thomas B. Stoddard, 
Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 648, 655 
(1987). 
35 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. 
36 Id. at 194–95. The Court in Bowers, however, neglected to evaluate through 
its own originalist prism whether it made any difference that oral sex – the offense for 
which Hardwick was arrested – was not included in any state’s statutory definition of 
sodomy until 1879, over a decade after the ratification of the Civil War Amendments. 
ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 17, at 24–25. 
37 See Kane, supra note 24, at 315. Between Bowers and Lawrence, sodomy was 
decriminalized by courts in Kentucky, Tennessee, Montana, Georgia, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Arkansas, and Massachusetts, and by state legislatures in Nevada, Rhode 
Island, and Arizona. Id. 
38 See id. Prior to Lawrence, statutory criminal prohibitions on sodomy were 
retained in Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Id. 
39 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2021). 
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the anus of another person with an object.”40  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Kennedy pronounced that “Bowers was not correct when it was 
decided, and it is not correct today,”41 and that the Texas statute at issue 
impermissibly burdened the petitioners’ liberty interests as “adults may 
choose to enter upon this [sexual] relationship in the confines of their 
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free 
persons.”42  
The majority also explicitly rejected the Bowers Court’s narrow 
formulation of the relevant constitutional question by maintaining that 
“[t]o say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain 
sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward.”43  The 
Lawrence holding was a watershed moment for both civil libertarians 
broadly as well as the gay and lesbian advocacy community specifically, 
for whom it “generated a palpable euphoria,”44 leading to speculation that 
the decision might “prove to be one of the most important civil rights cases 
of the twenty-first century” or even “the coup de grâce to legal moralism 
administered after a prolonged, brutish, tedious, and debilitating struggle 
against liberal legalism in its various criminal law representations.”45  
While by directly overruling Bowers the Lawrence Court created a new 
constitutional space for the protection of consensual sexual behavior, 
substantial constraints remained on the operative scope of the central 
holding in Lawrence that significantly limit the decision’s substantive 
effect.46  
The Court in Lawrence rejected both the doctrinal and historical 
analysis supplied by the Bowers majority.47  In examining “whether the 
petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the 
exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,”48 the Lawrence majority found ample support in the Court’s 
precedents related to both liberty and privacy for invalidating criminal 
prohibitions on consensual sexual conduct between adults and held that 
 
40 Id. §§ 21.01(1)(A)–(B) (2021). 
41 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
42 Id. at 567. 
43 Id. 
44 Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 
1618 (2004). 
45 Danaya C. Wright, The Logic and Experience of Law: Lawrence v. Texas and 
the Politics of Privacy, 15 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 403 (2004); Bernard E. 
Harcourt, Foreword: You Are Entering a Gay and Lesbian Free Zone: On the Radical 
Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post–) Queers – [Raising Questions About 
Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law], 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, 
503–504 (2004). 
46 See infra Part II. 
47 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–78. 
48 Id. at 564. 
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“[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify 
its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”49  
Likewise, the majority maintained that “the historical grounds relied upon 
in Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion and the concurring 
opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicate” and that “[t]heir historical 
premises are not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated.”50  
Though the decision made no mention of its effect for sodomy prohibitions 
in jurisdictions other than Texas, there is little reason to doubt the breadth 
of its intended operation – at least within the universe of sodomy 
regulations – due to the sweeping language employed by Justice Kennedy 
in rejecting the state’s proffered arguments for the constitutionality of its 
sodomy statute.51 
 
49 Id. at 578. Justice Scalia took special umbrage with this formulation of the 
central holding in Lawrence, which by his contention reflected that the majority 
employed rational basis review, rather than one of the heightened forms of scrutiny 
typically employed upon the alleged encumbrance of a fundamental right. Id. at 586 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). By contrast, Laurence Tribe has defended the pragmatism and 
flexibility of the majority’s approach to substantive due process in Lawrence. 
Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak 
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (noting that in Lawrence “the Court 
gave short shrift to the notion that it was under some obligation to confine its 
implementation of substantive due process to the largely mechanical exercise of 
isolating ‘fundamental rights’ as though they were a historically given set of data 
points on a two–dimensional grid, with one dimension representing time and the other 
representing a carefully defined and circumscribed sequence of protected primary 
activities”). The doctrinal complexity of the opinion was characterized more 
succinctly by Nan Hunter who offered that “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas is easy to read, but difficult to pin down.” Nan D. Hunter, Living 
with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (2004). 
50 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (majority). In rejecting the Bowers Court’s 
contention that the long history of statutes criminalizing sodomy gave meaningful 
constitutional cover to sodomy prohibitions in the late twentieth century, the Lawrence 
majority noted that “there is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed 
at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter,” that “[l]aws prohibiting sodomy do not 
seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in private,” and that 
“American laws targeting same–sex couples did not develop until the last third of the 
20th century.” Id. at 568–70. The Lawrence Court, then, seemed to recognize that 
many public policies whose application specifically targeted gays and lesbians were 
rooted in an anti–gay animus that did not arise until after Stonewall. See William 
Eskridge, Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and 
Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1014–20 (2005) (detailing the extensive efforts of 
the Save Our Children campaign to rescind county–level protections proscribing 
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation in Dade County, Florida, and 
elsewhere, as well as to prevent gay individuals from being eligible to adopt children). 
51 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for 
their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by 
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due 
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention 
of the government”). Justice Scalia, in dissent, famously believed the downstream 
11
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Although criminalizations of sodomy have functioned with some 
regularity as mechanisms to enshrine formally the stigmatization of 
homosexuality in law,52 not all prohibitions on sodomy explicitly target 
nonprocreative intercourse between members of the same sex for 
criminalization as did the Texas “homosexual conduct” statute challenged 
in Lawrence.53  This distinction mattered in particular for Justice 
O’Connor, herself a part of the original Bowers majority, as she concurred 
in the outcome of Lawrence but did not subscribe to the Court’s 
substantive due process analysis.54  Instead, Justice O’Connor advocated 
for the retention of the core holding in Bowers – that substantive due 
process did not bar criminal prohibitions on sodomy so long as such 
statutes apply equally to homosexual and heterosexual intimacy. Justice 
O’Connor simultaneously claimed the Texas “homosexual conduct” 
statute should fail to survive rational basis review pursuant to the Equal 
Protection Clause as the law “treats the same conduct differently based 
solely on the participants” and “makes homosexuals unequal in the eyes 
of the law by making particular conduct – and only that conduct – subject 
to criminal sanction.”55  For Justice O’Connor, then, prohibitions on 
sodomy and crimes against nature are not facially invalid due to their 
unreasonable interference with a constitutionally protected liberty interest, 
but rather, may be unconstitutional if by their discriminatory terms or 
through their discriminatory application they visit sufficient inequities 
upon politically vulnerable groups so as to violate the constitutional 
guarantee to equal protection under the law.56  This more conservative 
 
consequences of Lawrence would extend far beyond the invalidation of criminal 
prohibitions on sex between consenting adults, inveighing that “[s]tate laws against 
bigamy, same–sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, 
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers’ 
validation of laws based on moral choices.” Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
52 See William Eskridge, Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 
631, 632–33 (1999). 
53 See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 16–6–2(a)(1) (“A person commits the offense of 
sodomy when he or she performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs 
of one person and the mouth or anus of another”). Even the Texas prohibition against 
sodomy did not always target gay sex as explicitly as the statute challenged in 
Lawrence did. While the state’s original crime against nature statute (enacted in 1860) 
was mum on precisely what sexual conduct it sought to penalize – indeed, the law was 
so vague that Texas courts regularly overturned convictions pursuant to it until 1879, 
when the state legislature repealed the requirement that criminal laws be “expressly 
defined” in order to be enforceable – the Texas sodomy statute as revised in 1973 and 
as challenged in Lawrence did not attempt even the barest sleight of hand to conceal 
which part of the population it sought to target. Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past of 
Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1464, 1469–72 (2004). 
54 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579. 
55 Id. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
56 See id. at 579–85 (majority opinion). 
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privacy jurisprudence – rejected by the majority in Lawrence – would 
dramatically limit the extent to which the Constitution protects 
individuals’ right to engage in criminalization by the states. 
While contemporary reactions to the Lawrence holding either 
celebrated its forceful defense of individual liberty or lamented it for 
promoting tolerance of homosexuality, the decision itself went to some 
lengths in clarifying what exactly the case did not concern.57  Most likely 
to inoculate itself against the parade of horribles cited by Justice Scalia’s 
dissent as potential ramifications of the Lawrence rule going forward,58 
the decision stipulated in relevant part: 
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons 
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships 
where consent might not easily be refused.  It does not involve public 
conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government 
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual 
persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full 
and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices 
common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to 
respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence 
or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a 
crime.59 
In this paragraph clarifying the scope of the Lawrence rule, the 
majority enumerated a series of circumstances involving sexual conduct 
that by implication remain constitutionally regulable despite the central 
holding in the instant case.60  Namely, the exceptions paragraph suggests 
that the substantive due process doctrine as articulated in Lawrence was 
not intended to mandate the invalidation of criminal prohibitions on sex 
between adults and minors, forcible sex, commercial sex, or public sex, 
and instead makes evident that the engine driving the majority’s critical 
evaluation of the Texas homosexual conduct law was the burden imposed 
by the statute on private, consensual sexual intimacy between adults.61  In 
fact, as of the date of this publication, no concerted legal effort has been 
made to employ Lawrence as a mechanism for invalidating any of the 
criminal prohibitions enumerated above. What the Court neglected to 
 
57 Id. at 578. 
58 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
59 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. The exceptions paragraph also maintains that Lawrence should not be read 
as an endorsement of the notion that there exists any federal constitutional protection 
for same–sex marriage, but this did not stop Justice Kennedy from citing Lawrence as 
a supporting authority in decisions invalidating both federal and state same–sex 
marriage bans in the 2010s. Id.; see, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 667 
(2015); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013). 
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consider, however, and the object of inquiry in Part II below, is the 
possibility that the core holding in Lawrence – by my reading, that statutes 
criminalizing private sexual intimacy between consenting adults should be 
unenforceable against any conduct – might be construed so narrowly that 
it would permit states to continue imposing deprivations of individuals’ 
liberty and property, both directly and indirectly, as a result of criminal 
statutes facially proscribing sodomy.62 In other words, despite all its 
promise for the deregulation of consensual sexual conduct, the impact of 
the Lawrence decision is constrained by a nontrivial omission: the absence 
of precise and thorough guidelines for ensuring compliance with the 
constitutional demands both specified in and implied by the holding.63 
III. LIFE AFTER LAWRENCE: THE MIRAGE OF AUTOMATIC 
INVALIDATION 
The Lawrence decision is important not only for what it contains, but 
also for what it does not.64 As I detailed in Part I, the majority in Lawrence 
took conscious steps using the exceptions paragraph to reassure its 
skeptics that a diverse swath of prohibitions on sexual conduct would 
remain constitutionally viable even after the decision explicitly overruled 
Bowers v. Hardwick,65 and held that the Texas homosexual conduct statute 
– not merely its application – infringed on the substantive rights 
guaranteed by due process.66  The decision does not, however, denote with 
any precision how states should proceed to revise their criminal or 
administrative codes to ensure consistency with the majority’s reading of 
substantive due process in the wake of the Lawrence ruling.67  This Part 
argues that the absence of precise and thorough remedial guidelines to 
direct policy implementation in the Lawrence holding – though by no 
means a unique feature of that decision – confers excessive discretion on 
state judicial and prosecutorial officials to interpret selectively and 
narrowly their constitutional obligations under Lawrence and, in so doing, 
 
62 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 578; see discussion infra Part II. Mary Anne Case 
was nearly alone among prominent scholars in that she almost immediately recognized 
that the promise of the Lawrence holding might prove illusory or incomplete, though 
the concerns she raises – largely related to linguistic ambiguity in the decision – are 
separate from those I discuss in this Article. Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” 
in Lawrence v. Texas, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 83 (“Although I hope I am wrong, I can 
imagine that, in the same way as Bowers turned out … in the end not to be as bad as 
was feared for the progress of gay rights, Lawrence may turn out not to be as good as 
many now hope”). 
63 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
64 See id. 
65 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“Bowers…ought not to 
remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled”). 
66 Id. 
67 See id. 
14
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enables the continued (if limited) persistence of exactly the sort of legal 
regime that the Lawrence Court ostensibly intended to eradicate.68  In Part 
II-A, I provide an overview of the complications inherent in judicially 
directed alterations to public policy in a polity where governance is 
characterized by the radical fragmentation of authority; then, in Parts II-B 
through II-E, I analyze the manner in which legislative, judicial, and 
prosecutorial decisions made subsequent to Lawrence have allowed 
statutes criminally regulating sodomy to endure.69 
A. Implementing Judicial Decisions in a Decentralized Polity 
Thanks largely to the power of judicial review, courts play a more 
central role in the policy process in the United States than in many other 
advanced industrial democracies.70 In a formal sense, judicial review 
permits United States courts to strike down actions by legislative, 
executive, and even other judicial officials if such actions are inconsistent 
with the U.S. Constitution.71 Beyond this well-established 
conceptualization of judicial review as a negative power – i.e., the capacity 
to invalidate legislative and administrative policies they gauge as 
unconstitutional – scholars also understand the combination of judicial 
review alongside certain other features of the American constitutional 
 
68 See id. 
69 See id. 
70 See generally GORDAN SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, 
CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS 1–3 (2009) (maintaining that “[l]aw and 
politics cannot be disentangled in the United States” and that this relationship “has 
something to do with American political culture itself”); MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC 
STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, & JUDICIALIZATION (2002) (noting in their study of 
the judicialization of politics that while other countries in the post–World War II era 
have adopted some form of judicial review, the practice is most common and most 
closely associated with the United States); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: AN ESSAY 
ON LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICS 12 (1964) (suggesting that “[i]f many lawyers, in 
America especially, do recognize that the courts do legislate and make basic social 
choices, this is less true and even less accepted in other countries” and that in the 
United States “both the nature of the issues placed before the courts and the greater 
scope of choice available put the judiciary inevitably into the very midst of the great 
political battles of the nation”); Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court in American 
Politics, ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 161 (2003) (detailing the extent of judicial interventions 
in American public policy throughout the second half of the twentieth century); 
Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV.  50 (1976) (arguing that the Supreme Court provides more than simply a 
rubber stamp for the policy preferences of the elected branches). 
71 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 344 (1816) (holding that the 
United States Supreme Court could overrule state courts of last resort as regards 
disputes over federal law); Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (involving one of 
the first prominent instances of negative judicial review by the United States Supreme 
Court vis–à–vis a federal statute). 
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order as positively encouraging judicial participation in the policy 
process.72  More particularly, as political polarization in Congress 
increases, and when nonuniform partisan control across the Presidency 
and the chambers of Congress abets legislative gridlock, courts 
increasingly fill the vacuum resulting from inaction in the elected branches 
by providing answers to policy questions considered either too 
controversial or politically sensitive by officials concerned with 
reelection.73  Even when federal elected institutions are not gridlocked, 
courts participate actively in determining the distribution of rights, duties, 
and obligations in the American polity. Specifically, judicial decisions fill 
interstitial gaps in the terms of legislation, regulation, or existing judicial 
precedent by providing a definitive legal interpretation of ambiguous or 
imprecise language whose meaning is the subject of litigation.74 
Despite the enormous authority enjoyed by American courts 
exercising judicial review, the enforcement of judicial decisions, by and 
large, occurs through a constitutional leap of faith.75  In other words, even 
if the Supreme Court holds that a given state law or practice is 
unconstitutional on its face, there exists no guarantee that the state in 
question – let alone states where equivalent or substantially comparable 
statutes, rules, or practices are also in place76 – will immediately cease 
 
72 See, e.g., Jeb Barnes, Adversarial Legalism, the Rise of Judicial Policymaking, 
and the Separation–of–Powers Doctrine, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW: AN 
INTERBRANCH PERSPECTIVE 35, 35–36 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004) 
(arguing that the fragmentation of authority across American institutions has “placed 
courts at the center of important political and policy disputes almost since [the 
country’s] founding” and detailing how an excessively formalistic conception of the 
separation of powers encourages the underestimation of American judicial power). 
73 See Jeb Barnes, Bringing the Courts Back In: Interbranch Perspectives on the 
Role of Courts in American Politics and Policy Making, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 25, 
27–28 (2007) (contending that the structure of the U.S. government incentivizes 
“games of political ‘hot potato,’ in which each branch tries to fob off controversial 
issues on another”). 
74 See, e.g., THOMAS M. KECK, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN POLARIZED TIMES (2014) 
(detailing the increase in the employment of litigation as a means attempting to resolve 
divisive political issues); James J. Brudney, The Supreme Court as Interstitial Actor: 
Justice Ginsburg’s Eclectic Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 
889, 911–12 (2009) (describing courts as participating in an ongoing dialogue with 
other public institutions through their corrections of legislative policy). 
75 See, e.g., Kevin C. Walsh, Judicial Departmentalism: An Introduction, 58 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1713, 1729 (2017) (maintaining that judicial determinations of 
public policy only create obligations as judgments for the parties, through the law of 
remedies, and as precedent for other courts, but – unlike proponents of judicial 
supremacy – that judicial decisions do not bind legislative or executive ventures into 
constitutional interpretation). 
76 The expectation that states should cease enforcing a statute if it is comparable 
to one from another state declared constitutionally deficient by the Supreme Court has 
been called judicial universality by Josh Blackman. Blackman, supra note 5, at 1155–
59. 
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enforcing the law or engaging in the practice.77  For this reason, while a 
judicial decision (from the Supreme Court or otherwise) bringing a policy 
into constitutional disrepute is a necessary first step in preventing 
continued implementation, the announcement of the holding alone is not a 
sufficient condition for ensuring enforcement of the policy ceases. I refer 
to this common expectation – the assumption that the immediate 
consequence of negative judicial review is the abandonment of the practice 
deemed unconstitutional – as the mirage of automatic invalidation. 
While United States courts may be uniquely well-suited to contribute 
to the process of formulating public policy, they lack the requisite 
institutional characteristics to participate as meaningfully in policy 
implementation.78  In particular, it is a challenge for United States courts 
to guarantee compliance with their holdings due to (1) the fundamental 
passivity of American judicial institutions,79 and (2) the decentralization 
of political authority in the American federal system.80  Institutional 
passivity complicates the implementation of judicially constructed public 
policy because United States courts are constitutionally barred from 
issuing decisions or directives in the absence of an active case or 
controversy; powerless to root out instances of noncompliance 
independently, they must instead wait for litigants to discover or 
experience defiance of judicial rulings and bring suit themselves as a 
 
77 See, e.g., Mark Golub, Remembering Massive Resistance to School 
Desegregation, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 491 (2013) (chronicling the difficulty of 
implementing the Brown v. Board of Education holding throughout the southern 
United States, where recalcitrant officials engaged in a program of so–called massive 
resistance to school integration). 
78 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 15–21 (1991) (arguing that institutional and organizational features 
of American courts lead to special challenges for the enforcement of judicial policy 
revisions). 
79 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (delineating the constitutional case or controversy 
requirement, which limits U.S. judicial power to those instances in which there exists 
a live dispute, and thus prohibits courts from issuing advisory opinions or unsolicited 
remedial holdings as to do so would constitute deciding disputes in which litigants 
have not brought a case). 
80 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 298–300 (1989) (contrasting the 
concentration of political authority in parliamentary systems with the policy process 
in the United States which he compares to a “barroom brawl” where “[a]nybody can 
join in, the combatants fight all comers and sometimes change sides, no referee is in 
charge, and the fight lasts not for a fixed number of rounds but indefinitely or until 
everybody drops from exhaustion”). In addition to the multiplicity of institutions in 
the national government responsible for the development of public policy – the 
product of the horizontal fragmentation of authority across legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches as well as the abundance of policy–relevant agencies, offices, and 
bureaus in the administrative state – American political power is also vertically 
divided between the national government and the fifty state governments which retain 
powers not delegated to federal institutions. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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corrective action.81 Assuming that an adequate remedy for noncompliance 
exists – itself not always a certainty – judicial passivity nevertheless shifts 
the burden for monitoring and reporting the compliance status with a given 
ruling to stakeholder groups and individuals in the polity.  If such 
interested parties encounter public institutions ignoring (whether willfully 
or negligently) a judicial decision but are unaware of their legal rights to 
initiate litigation challenging noncompliance – or are unable or unwilling 
to contest non-implementation themselves – American courts lack the 
authority to launch the pursuit of legal recourse independently. 
The challenges presented by judicial passivity for the enforcement of 
court decisions are magnified by the decentralization of political authority 
in the United States.  As the Constitution divides power vertically between 
national and state governments, and horizontally through the separation of 
powers into legislative, executive, and judicial functions at both the 
national and state levels, the responsibility for formulating and 
implementing public policy in the United States is fragmented across 
hundreds of thousands of individuals.82  The separation of powers presents 
a challenge to the consistent enforcement of judicial rulings as American 
courts lack directly accountable agents responsible for affirmatively 
overseeing the implementation phase of a court decision.83  Rather, courts 
rely on cooperation by officials serving in the myriad other public 
institutions whose compliance is required for judicial decisions to be 
 
81 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
82 This crude estimate of hundreds of thousands is based on the following: in 
addition to the 535 members of the U.S. Congress, there are hundreds of judges 
serving in the federal judiciary and, according to the Congressional Research Service, 
over 2 million members of the federal executive branch civilian workforce even 
excluding the postal service. JULIE JENNINGS & JARED C. NAGEL, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R43590, FEDERAL WORKFORCE STATISTICS SOURCES: OPM AND OMB (2020).  
Though presumably not all 2 million federal civil servants have expansive policy 
discretion, many do; when added to the population of state legislators – according to 
the NCSL, there are 7383 across the United States – as well as state judges and 
bureaucrats as well as local (city and county) public officials, it would seem the crude 
estimate offered here may in actuality be a conservative one. See Number of 
Legislators and Length of Terms in Years, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about–state–legislatures/number–of–legislators–and–
length–of–terms.aspx [https://perma.cc/8HJ2-FSJE] (last visited Jan. 25, 2021). 
83 See Clifford J. Carrubba and Christopher Zorn, Executive Discretion, Judicial 
Decision Making, and Separation of Powers in the United States, 72 J. POL. 812, 822–
23 (2010) (finding that the executive branch’s willingness to comply with U.S. 
Supreme Court holdings is inconsistent and incomplete, as “[h]igh court influence 
critically depends upon indirect enforcement of its decisions by the public”); but see 
David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 732 
(2009) (arguing that “[t]he ability of courts to mobilize the public against the 
government means that government disobedience of courts carries potentially severe 
consequences.”). 
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effectively implemented.84  This includes, so far as substantive criminal 
law is concerned, the expectation that law enforcement will cease arresting 
individuals for allegedly having committed offenses if the relevant 
statutory criminal prohibition – or one substantially comparable to it from 
another state – has been found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 
Likewise, if for some reason an individual experiences a deprivation of 
their rights or liberties as a result of allegedly having violated a 
presumptively unconstitutional law, inferior courts (whether federal or 
state) reviewing the arrest or conviction are generally expected to follow 
established Supreme Court precedent and refuse to permit the enforcement 
of the invalidated prohibition.85 
The lesson passed down from history and reinforced by 
contemporary experience (including the subject matter of this Article), is 
that common expectations about the enforcement of judicial decisions – 
corollaries to the mirage of automatic invalidation – may easily be 
frustrated by entrenched noncooperation, or even active defiance, among 
recalcitrant officials including but not limited to judges, legislators, police, 
and prosecutors.86  Further, the decentralization of political authority 
presents an even more vexing difficulty given the passivity of the 
American judiciary: if, for instance, multiple states refuse to cease 
enforcement of laws presumed unconstitutional based on a decision by the 
Supreme Court, preventing continued noncompliance with the holding 
may require initiating separate litigation in each noncooperative 
jurisdiction. This inefficiency – among the pathologies inherent in a 
federal system – substantially raises the costs associated with eradicating 
localized resistance to judicially directed policy revisions.  
Taken together, the passivity of judicial institutions and the 
decentralization of political authority in the United States generate serious 
complications for ensuring that the legal, social, and economic effects of 
court rulings are not circumscribed as a result of either deliberate or 
 
84 ROSENBERG, supra note 78, at 15 (maintaining that “for Court orders to be 
carried out, political elites, electorally accountable, must support them and act to 
implement them”). 
85 See id. at 18 (noting that appellate courts rely on the willingness of trial courts 
to implement their holdings as “[o]nly rarely do appellate courts issue final orders,” 
leaving “lower–court judges with a great deal of discretion”). 
86 Thoroughgoing, organized noncompliance with Brown v. Board of Education 
of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) throughout the American South is probably the most 
prominent example of this phenomenon. See id. at 39–106 (making the case that 
widespread integration of public facilities and expansion of voting rights occurred 
primarily as a function of legislative and executive, rather than judicial, action).  More 
recently, some local officials attempted to avoid compliance with the Supreme Court’s 
decision to invalidate state–level same–sex marriage bans in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
576 U.S. 644 (2015), though nothing even approaching the campaign of massive 
resistance in the South after Brown. Brown, 347 U.S. at 483; Tiffany C. Graham, 
Obergefell and Resistance, 84 UMKC L. REV. 715, 725–31 (2016). 
19
Peterson: The Walking Dead: How the Criminal Regulation of Sodomy Survived
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
876 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
negligent noncompliance with judicial decisions.  To overcome these 
institutional obstacles foists considerable demands on both litigants and 
advocates to ferret out acts of noncompliance across many geographic 
subunits and then navigate legal challenges in multiple fora across the 
polycentric system of American government.  The remaining subsections 
of Part II analyze the manner in which public officials have approached 
the criminalization of sodomy after Lawrence v. Texas, and present 
evidence suggesting that due to precisely the sort of institutional 
constraints on the judiciary discussed here, criminal prohibitions on 
sodomy – rather than being the object of automatic invalidation – have 
survived their intended death.87 
B. Formal Changes to State Sodomy Prohibitions after Lawrence 
By the time Lawrence was decided, the majority of U.S. states had 
decriminalized consensual sodomy but statutory prohibitions on 
consensual sodomy or crimes against nature remained enforceable in 
 
87 539 U.S. 558 (2003). My argument is consistent with Howard Wasserman’s 
contention that constitutional adjudication rests on the principle (among others) that 
“[c]onstitutionally defective laws do not disappear or cease to be law following a 
judicial ruling,” that a “Court’s declaration of constitutional invalidity...does not mean 
the law ceases to take effect or ceases to [] exist once it has taken effect.” Howard 
Wasserman, Precedent, Non–Universal Injunctions, and Judicial Departmentalism: 
A Model of Constitutional Adjudication, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1077, 1080 
(2020). 
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss3/7
2021] THE CRIMINAL REGULATION OF SODOMY 877 
fourteen states:88 Alabama,89 Florida,90 Idaho,91 Kansas,92 Louisiana,93 
Michigan,94 Mississippi,95 Missouri,96 North Carolina,97 Oklahoma,98 
 
88 These remaining statutory prohibitions on sodomy are comparable in many 
regards to the state statutes enacted to organize racial segregation that were not 
repealed for decades after Brown. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954); see Still on the Books: Jim Crow and Segregation Laws Fifty Years after 
Brown v. Board of Education, a Report on Laws Remaining in the Codes of Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia, 2006 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 460 (2006) [hereinafter Still on the Books].  By contrast, however, 
while laws segregating public facilities were not widely enforced once massive 
resistance came to an end, the tendency for jurisdictions to continue enforcing criminal 
prohibitions on sodomy I examine in Parts II–C and II–D may not yet be in its decline. 
Still on the Books; see also discussion infra Part II–C and II–D. 
89 ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-63 to -64 (2013). In 2019, the Alabama state legislature 
amended the state’s regulations on sexual conduct by striking the term “deviate sexual 
intercourse” from the code, formerly defined as “[a]ny act of sexual gratification 
between persons not married to each other involving the sex organs of one person and 
the mouth or anus of another,” but then instead created a new statutory definition of 
“sodomy,” defined as “[a]ny sexual act involving the genitals of one person and the 
mouth or anus of another person.”  S.B. 320, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Al. 2019). Under the 
revised statutes, sodomy remains a criminal offense in the event that the act is forcible, 
one party lacks the physical or mental capacity to give consent, or there is a 
sufficiently large age gap between the parties.  ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-63 to -64 (2019). 
The provision from the pre–revision code which had defined deviate sexual 
intercourse as only occurring between unmarried persons had been found by a state 
appellate court to violate equal protection in 1986 but had not yet been revised prior 
to the 2019 legislative session. Joseph A. Colquitt, The Alabama Criminal Code – 25 
Years and Counting, 56 ALA. L. REV. 967, 988–89 (2005). 
90 FLA. STAT. § 800.2 (2021).  Florida’s original crimes against nature statute was 
struck down by the state supreme court for unconstitutional vagueness in 1971, but 
the same court held concurrently that anal and oral sex could still be prosecuted 
pursuant to the state’s unnatural and lascivious conduct statute. Franklin v. State, 257 
So.2d 21, 24 (Fla. 1971). 
91 IDAHO CODE § 18–6605 (2021). 
92 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21–5504 (2011), invalidated by State v. Franco, 319 P.3d 
551 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014). 
93 LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (2018), invalidated by La. Electorate of Gays and 
Lesbians, Inc. v. Connick, 902 So.2d 1090 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
94 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.158 (2021). In addition to sodomy, the Michigan 
code penalizes acts of “gross indecency.” Id. 
95 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97–29–59 (2021); but cf. Doe v. Hood, 345 F. Supp. 3d 
749, 762 (D. Miss. 2018) (calling into doubt constitutional validity of Mississippi 
sodomy statute). 
96 MO. REV. STAT. § 566.060 (2005). 
97 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–177 (2021), invalidated by State v. Whiteley, 616 
S.E.2d 576 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
98 OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (2021). 
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South Carolina,99 Texas,100 Utah,101 and Virginia.102  In other states, 
statutes criminally sanctioning sodomy or crimes against nature remained 
on the books but had been invalidated by state courts prior to Lawrence.103 
While the decision in Lawrence appears rather clearly to render any 
continuing efforts to criminalize private, consensual sexual conduct 
impermissible, few of the states whose sodomy prohibitions were still 
operable in early 2003 took affirmative steps to formally repeal their 
statutes criminalizing sodomy after the decision was handed down. 
However, state legislatures in Alabama, Missouri, Utah, and Virginia 
revised their state codes in the years following Lawrence to approach 
consistency with the Court’s endorsement of constitutional protections for 
private, consensual sexual behavior.104  In Alabama, the legislature revised 
the state’s criminal code in 2019 by excising the prohibition on deviate 
sexual intercourse and replacing it with criminal prohibitions on sodomy 
involving the use of force, sex with minors, or where one party lacks 
capacity to consent.105  This followed an earlier action by the Missouri 
state legislature, which amended its sodomy statute to criminalize only 
nonconsensual or forcible sodomy.106  The state legislatures of Virginia 
and Utah followed a similar trajectory, altering their states’ criminal codes 
 
99 S.C. ANN. § 16–15–120 (2021). 
100 TEX. PENAL CODE. ANN. § 21.06(a) (2021), invalidated by City of Dallas v. 
England, 846 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 
101 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76–5–403 (2019). 
102
 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–361 (2014), invalidated by MacDonald v. Moose, 710 
F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2013). 
103 See, e.g., Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998) (holding that the 
Georgia sodomy statute upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bowers was a violation 
of the right to privacy as protected in the Georgia Constitution); Gay & Lesbian 
Advocates & Defs. v. Attorney Gen., 763 N.E.2d 38, 40 (Mass. 2002) (holding that 
private, consensual sexual conduct cannot be constitutionally criminalized in 
Massachusetts). 
104 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see infra notes 106–107 and 
accompanying text. 
105 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
106 Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 566.060 (2019) (stipulating that a person 
commits sodomy “if he or she has deviate sexual intercourse with another person who 
is incapacitated, incapable of consent, or lacks the capacity to consent, or by the use 
of forcible compulsion”), with id. § 566.090(1) (2005) (criminalizing sexual 
misconduct, which is defined as engaging in “deviate sexual intercourse with another 
person of the same sex”). Unlike the Alabama definition, the Missouri statutes’ 
definition of deviate sexual intercourse, still in effect today, does not limit deviate 
sexual intercourse to sex between unmarried persons. MO. REV. STAT. § 566.010(3) 
(2021). Prior to both the Missouri statute’s modification as well as Lawrence, the 
Missouri sexual misconduct law was invalidated for counties in the northwestern part 
of the state by the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District, which held that 
defendants could only be convicted of sexual misconduct if the state could prove that 
the defendant’s sexual partner did not consent to the act. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558; 
State v. Cogshell, 997 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
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to ensure as a legislative matter that private, consensual sodomy was no 
longer formally a criminal offense in 2014 and 2019, respectively.107  In 
addition to these four states, legislators in Maryland and Montana enacted 
bills to repeal prohibitions on sodomy that remained in their states’ codes 
despite pre-Lawrence litigation in each state’s courts having invalidated 
the sodomy bans.108 
Prior to the Virginia General Assembly’s decision to decriminalize 
sodomy in 2014, the commonwealth’s crimes against nature statute was 
already of doubtful constitutionality due to Lawrence.109  In MacDonald 
v. Moose, the Fourth Circuit interpreted Lawrence to hold that the 
provision of the Virginia crimes against nature statute criminalizing 
sodomy was facially unconstitutional.110  In 2005, William Scott 
MacDonald was convicted of criminal solicitation based on a state court’s 
finding that he had solicited oral sex from a young woman.111  The Virginia 
statute on criminal solicitation imposes felony sanctions on “[a]ny person 
who commands, entreats, or otherwise attempts to persuade another 
person to commit a felony other than murder.”112 Therefore, some 
predicate felonious offense whose commission was solicited by the 
accused is a necessary condition for a criminal solicitation conviction.113 
In MacDonald’s case, the predicate for the solicitation charge was the offer 
 
107 See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–361 (2014) (defining crimes against nature as 
bestiality and incest); see also S.B. 14, 2014 Sess. (Va. 2014) (removing sodomy from 
the statutory list of crimes against nature in § 18.2–361); Compare UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 76–5–403(1)–(3) (2017) (making it a class B misdemeanor if someone “engages in 
any sexual act with a person who is 14 years of age or older involving the genitals of 
one person and mouth or anus of another person”) with id. § 76–5–403 (2019) 
(criminalizing only forcible sodomy). 
108 H.B. 81, 441st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2020) ((repealing the criminal 
prohibitions on sodomy from §§ 3–321 and 3–322 of the state’s criminal code as well 
as striking sodomy from the list of statutory examples of “sexual molestation or 
exploitation” in the definitions statute governing procedures in the state’s juvenile 
proceedings at § 3–801(aa)(5)); compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–2–101(20) (1997) 
(defining deviate sexual relations as “sexual contact or sexual intercourse between two 
persons of the same sex or any form of sexual intercourse with an animal”) with id. § 
45–2–101(21) (2019) (defining deviate sexual relations only as sexual intercourse 
with an animal)l; Williams v. Glendening, No. 98036031/CL–1059, 1998 WL 
965992, at *7 (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 1998) (clarifying that the Maryland sodomy ban 
should not apply to private, consensual sex); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 123 
(Mont. 1997) (holding that Montana’s deviate sexual conduct statute violates the right 
to privacy protected by Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution). 
109 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see supra note 102 and 
accompanying text. 
110 710 F.3d 154, 166 (4th Cir. 2013); see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
111 MacDonald v. Moose, 710 F.3d 154, 157–158 (4th Cir. 2013). 
112 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–29 (2021). 
113 See id. 
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to commit what remained on the Virginia books as sodomy.114  At trial, 
MacDonald unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the criminal solicitation 
charge “on the ground that the predicate felony – the anti-sodomy 
provision – violated his due process rights.”115  After his conviction, 
MacDonald initiated federal proceedings, where the Eastern Virginia 
District Court rejected his claim that the sodomy prohibition was 
unconstitutional as applied “because the Commonwealth had properly 
treated seventeen-year-olds as children, and because the Lawrence 
decision had stressed that ‘[t]he present case does not involve minors,’ the 
anti-sodomy provision could constitutionally serve as a predicate offense 
under the solicitation statute.”116  The District Court thus attempted to 
locate a constitutional stopgap for the Virginia crimes against nature 
statute (which banned all sodomy, regardless the age or consent status of 
the participants) in Lawrence’s exceptions paragraph by reading that case 
as forbidding the criminalization of private, nonprocreative sex between 
consenting adults, but not proscribing the enforcement of sodomy bans so 
long as the conduct underlying the charge qualifies under one of 
Lawrence’s exceptions.117 
MacDonald appealed from the Eastern District of Virginia to the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, where a three-judge panel endorsed his 
theory of Lawrence’s scope.118 The Fourth Circuit panel recognized a 
broad conception of the constitutional safeguards protecting private, 
consensual sexual intimacy, maintaining that “[i]n Lawrence, the Supreme 
Court plainly held that statutes criminalizing private acts of consensual 
sodomy between adults are inconsistent with the protections of liberty 
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”119  The 
Court elaborated further that because the Lawrence majority 
unambiguously overruled Bowers, and because the Virginia crimes against 
nature statute was “materially indistinguishable from” the Georgia statute 
at issue in Bowers, faithful adherence to Lawrence compels the conclusion 
“that the anti-sodomy provision, prohibiting sodomy between two persons 
without any qualification, is facially unconstitutional.”120  
 
114 MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 157–158; see id. 
115 MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 157. 
116 Id. at 159 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)). 
117 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); see supra notes 60–63 and 
accompanying text. 
118 MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 159, 167. Namely, MacDonald asserted that “the 
Virginia courts have impermissibly interpreted Lawrence as authorizing them to recast 
the anti–sodomy provision – which by its terms bans all sodomy offenses – and apply 
the provision solely to sodomy offenses that involve minors.” Id. at 160. 
119 Id. at 163 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578). 
120 Id. at 163–67. The MacDonald majority did not dispute the abstract 
possibility that some criminal regulations of sodomy are in all likelihood 
constitutionally permissible pursuant to Lawrence’s exceptions paragraph so long as 
the prohibitions are drafted in more specific terms than the Virginia crimes against 
24
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The Fourth Circuit, thus, adamantly rejected the constitutional 
integrity of a state statute that criminalizes sodomy if the law is drafted 
without any qualifying or explicatory criteria that make clear the statute’s 
prohibitions do not apply to private, consensual sex between adults.121  
Perhaps of equal significance, the Court’s holding suggests that a statute 
criminalizing the type of behavior deemed constitutionally protected by 
Lawrence is invalid not only in the context of direct enforcement (as in 
Lawrence), but also if employed indirectly as a statutory felony predicate 
to a criminal solicitation charge.122  As discussed at greater length in Parts 
II-C and II-D below, there are common, ongoing practices in a number of 
states that employ both pre- and post-Lawrence sodomy convictions to 
justify the imposition of legal, administrative, and financial burdens on 
individuals in a manner that contravenes the notion articulated in 
MacDonald that neither direct nor collateral enforcement of statutes 
criminalizing consensual sodomy is constitutionally sound.123 
Contrary, then, to conventional wisdom in both the legal academy 
and popular imagination, to assert that Lawrence invalidated all sodomy 
laws is an oversimplification, and few states took steps formally to repeal 
criminal prohibitions on sodomy in their jurisdiction after 2003.124  Rather, 
Lawrence cast explicit constitutional disapproval on the criminalization of 
private sexual intimacy between consenting adults, but through the 
exceptions paragraph let multiple avenues remain which state regulations 
on sexual behavior might nevertheless survive.125  To be clear, I take no 
steps here to dispute that there may exist compelling policy rationales for 
criminalizing some of the conduct left constitutionally eligible for sanction 
by the exceptions paragraph (e.g., sex with young children, sexual 
intercourse in which a party does not or cannot consent).  I argue, however, 
 
nature had been. Id. at 165–66. The Fourth Circuit maintained, however, that 
amending the state’s sodomy law to pass constitutional muster was a legislative, rather 
than a judicial, task, as “[t]he [Supreme] Court’s ruminations [in Lawrence] 
concerning the circumstances under which a state might permissibly outlaw sodomy, 
however, no doubt contemplated deliberate action by the people’s representatives, 
rather than by the judiciary.” Id. at. 165. 
121 See id. at 166–67. Some critics disagree with the Fourth Circuit’s treatment 
of the Virginia crimes against nature statute, alleging that rather than “treating [the 
crimes against nature statute] as partially facially unconstitutional, the Fourth Circuit 
should have treated it as the Virginia courts did: unenforceable in those circumstances 
in which its enforcement would infringe on the personal liberty interests recognized 
in Lawrence, but otherwise enforceable.” Kevin C. Walsh, Observations on 
MacDonald v. Moose, 65 S. C. L. REV. 951, 960 (2014). 
122 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79. 
123 See infra Part II–D. 
124 See generally MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 45–33–23(h)(xi), 97–29–59; GA. CODE. 
ANN. § 42–1–12(a)(10)(B)(v); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23–3–430(C)(11); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 14–177; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18–6605; LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:89(A)(2) (2006). 
125 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
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that to permit the continued imposition of criminal liability – whether 
directly or indirectly – pursuant to state laws that on their face penalize 
private sexual intimacy between consenting adults perverts the core rule 
in Lawrence even if, as in MacDonald, the specific conduct the state 
sought to punish in a given case would itself have been illegal had the 
prohibitory statute been more carefully drafted. As I demonstrate below, 
the criminal regulation of sodomy has endured after Lawrence through 
precisely the kinds of maneuvers rejected in MacDonald, and in the 
subsections that follow, I catalog the direct and indirect means by which 
criminal prohibitions on sodomy have survived their own purported death. 
C. Direct Enforcement of Sodomy Laws After Lawrence 
Developments in the criminal regulation of sodomy over the past two 
decades suggest that Lawrence slowed down the imposition of criminal 
sanctions pursuant to statutes that on their face prohibit private, 
consensual, nonprocreative intercourse, but it did not stop the enforcement 
of such laws altogether.  Through the combination of legislative refusal to 
repeal statutes criminalizing private, consensual sodomy and judicial 
reluctance to read Lawrence’s constitutional directive with the appropriate 
breadth, several states – as well as the United States military126 – have 
shown little interest in ceasing to enforce laws that seem to violate the core 
rule from Lawrence.127 The following is intended to constitute neither an 
argument for decriminalizing the sexual practices prosecuted in the 
subsequent discussion, nor a normative justification of the conduct; rather, 
I contend that should public officials wish to impose criminal prohibitions 
on the forms of sexual behavior suggested by Lawrence’s list of 
exceptions, they should follow the letter and spirit of Lawrence by doing 
so pursuant to statutes tailored to criminalize that – and only that – 
conduct. 
The ongoing employment of statutes facially criminalizing private, 
consensual, nonprocreative sexual intercourse to regulate sexual behavior 
in Louisiana, Idaho, and North Carolina is illustrative of the tendency in 
some states to continue treating sodomy bans as remaining enforceable in 
 
126 See United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 203 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (holding that 
Lawrence did not facially invalidate the ban on sodomy in the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, and creating a three–part as–applied analysis for military courts to 
discern whether enforcement of the UCMJ sodomy prohibition in a given case does 
or does not violate Lawrence). 
127 See, e.g., State v. Gomez–Alas, 477 P.3d 911, 918 (Idaho 2020) (interpreting 
Lawrence as only creating “a constitutional prohibition against criminalizing the 
private sexual conduct of two consenting adults” but not against a statute that does so 
on its face). 
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at least some circumstances after Lawrence.128  In 2003, Tina Thomas 
appeared before a Louisiana trial court charged with soliciting an 
undercover police officer to engage in “unnatural carnal copulation for 
compensation” in violation of the Louisiana crime against nature statute.129  
The trial court granted Thomas’s motion to quash by reading Lawrence as 
rendering the Louisiana crime against nature statute constitutionally 
inoperable.130  Interpreting Lawrence as standing for the proposition that 
“all persons” deserve freedom from government interference “in deciding 
their sexual activities and preferences providing the relationship involves 
consenting adults,” the Court held that the statute violated the substantive 
due process guarantee to liberty.131  Further, the trial court noted that had 
Thomas offered the undercover agent vaginal – rather than oral – 
intercourse, she would instead have been charged with prostitution (a 
misdemeanor in Louisiana) rather than a crime against nature (a felony).132  
Thus, the trial court emphasized the inequity inherent in statutes that 
establish as official state policy an enhanced punitive regime governing 
the primary sexual behavior practiced by those desiring same-sex intimacy 
as compared with vaginal intercourse.133  On appeal, however, the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana called the trial court’s “reliance on 
Lawrence…misplaced,” and interpreted Lawrence as analytically 
irrelevant due to its reference to commercial sex in the exceptions 
paragraph.134 Further, the Court held that the provision of the crime against 
nature statute pursuant to which Thomas was charged (which criminalized 
solicitation of unnatural carnal copulation) was severable from the portion 
of the statute facially criminalizing consensual sexual conduct and thus 
remained enforceable.135 
 
128 LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:89(A)(2) (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18–6605; N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 14–177. 
129 State v. Thomas, 891 So.2d 1233, 1234 (La. 2005); LA. STAT. ANN. § 
14:89(A)(2) (2006). 
130 Thomas, 891 So.2d at 1234–35. 




135 At the time Thomas was decided, Louisiana regulated consensual sodomy via 
two subsections of the crime against nature statute. Compare LA. STAT. ANN. § 
14:89(A)(1) (2006) (criminalizing “[t]he unnatural carnal copulation by a human 
being with another of the same sex or opposite sex”) with LA. STAT. ANN. § 
14:89(A)(2) (2006) (criminalizing “[t]he solicitation by a human being of another with 
the intent to engage in any unnatural carnal copulation for compensation”). After 
multiple revisions to the code subsequent to Lawrence, Louisiana still criminalizes 
consensual crimes against nature as well as the solicitation of crimes against nature 
separately using substantially comparable language, but now codified in different 
sections of the code, possibly due to consistent biennial reports by the Louisiana State 
Law Institute Constitutional Laws Committee to the state legislature suggesting the 
consensual sodomy ban is unconstitutional. Unconstitutional Statutes Biennial Report 
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Although in Thomas the Louisiana Supreme Court avoided passing 
direct judgment on the facial constitutionality of the state’s prohibition on 
consensual crimes against nature by focusing on the subsection of the 
Louisiana code criminalizing solicitation, the Court’s language betrays its 
likely estimation of the consensual sodomy ban’s constitutional merit.136  
Namely, the Court read Lawrence as leaving “unaffected charges 
involving public conduct or prostitution.”137  The Lawrence Court, 
however, demonstrated its judgment that an entire statute was 
unenforceable, rather than simply invalidating a charge entered pursuant 
to that statute.138  More importantly, the Louisiana law criminalizing 
consensual crimes against nature is the functional equivalent of the 
Georgia statute upheld as constitutional in Bowers, which Lawrence 
unambiguously overturned.139  By interpreting Lawrence as governing 
charging decisions pursuant to statutes that facially criminalize consensual 
sodomy – rather than the constitutionality of such statutory regulations 
altogether – the Supreme Court of Louisiana demonstrates its 
understanding of Lawrence as an as-applied judgment proscribing the 
criminal prosecution of private, consensual, nonprocreative intercourse, 
but not the enactment of statutes that can only be interpreted to exempt 
private, consensual sex from criminal sanction through the most laborious 
mental gymnastics.140 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has also read Lawrence as forbidding 
prosecutors from charging defendants with crimes against nature for 
engaging in private, consensual, nonprocreative intercourse, but as 
otherwise not affecting the Idaho sodomy ban, which imposes a minimum 
five-year prison sentence for “[e]very person who is guilty of the infamous 
crime against nature.”141  In State v. Cook, the Idaho appellate court 
reviewed a claim by Jack Cook, who had been charged with the felony 
 
to the Legislature, LA. STATE L. INST. CONST. L. COMM. 36 (Mar. 13, 2018) 
https://lsli.org/files/reports/2018/2018%20Unconstitutional%20Statutes%20Biennial
%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7GS-ASR8]. 
136 See Thomas, 891 So.2d at 1235–38. 
137 Id. at 1238 (emphasis added). 
138 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The Texas statute furthers no 
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life 
of the individual”). 
139 See GA. CODE. ANN. § 16–6–2(a)(1); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:89(A)(1) (2006).  
Unlike the Texas statute at issue in Lawrence, the Georgia and Louisiana sodomy bans 
criminalize nonprocreative sexual intercourse between both same–sex and opposite–
sex couples. See GA. CODE. ANN. § 16–6–2(a)(1); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:89(A)(1) 
(2006). 
140 See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14.89(A)(1) (2019) (criminalizing unnatural 
carnal copulation regardless of consent, venue, the existence of a transactional 
relationship between the parties, or their ages). 
141 State v. Cook, 192 P.3d 1086 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 
18–6605. 
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crime against nature for performing fellatio on an individual with Down’s 
Syndrome in a gym sauna.142  Cook pleaded guilty to having oral sex with 
another individual, but the information charging Cook stipulated neither 
that the act took place in public nor that the other individual could not 
consent.143  As such, Cook appealed on the grounds that per the terms of 
the information he could have faced a conviction based on private, 
consensual sex as well.144  The Idaho Court of Appeals rejected Cook’s 
claim as he had “not shown that he was prosecuted for conduct that 
occurred in private and with an adult who could and did consent,” and held 
that Cook not “admit[ting] some details of the underlying allegations when 
he pled guilty is not relevant.”145  Like the Louisiana Supreme Court in 
State v. Thomas, then, the Idaho Court of Appeals interpreted Lawrence as 
demanding only an as-applied review of a law that facially criminalizes 
consensual sexual behavior.146 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has also approvingly cited 
Lawrence’s exceptions paragraph in its entirety to support its judgment 
that the North Carolina sodomy ban does not facially violate substantive 
due process.147  Defendant Gregory Paul Whiteley appealed his conviction 
under the North Carolina crime against nature statute arguing the statute 
was facially unconstitutional. The appellate court charged that the 
exceptions paragraph “clearly indicates that state regulation of sexual 
conduct involving minors, non-consensual or coercive conduct, public 
conduct, and prostitution falls outside the boundaries of the liberty interest 
protecting personal relations and is therefore constitutionally 
permissible.”148  Just as the Louisiana Supreme Court focused myopically 
on whether a charging decision pursuant to a statute criminalizing 
consensual sex violated Tina Thomas’s constitutional guarantee to liberty, 
the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered the “regulation” of sexual 
behavior in an analytic vacuum, paying no heed to whether the relevant 
laws pursuant to which the state elects to “regulate” sexual conduct from 
the exceptions paragraph criminalize private, consensual, nonprocreative 
sex.149  Whiteley had been charged with second degree rape, second degree 
 
142 Cook, 192 P.3d at 1086. 
143 Id. at 1087. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 1088. 
146 See id. (holding that “Cook failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing 
that I.C. § 18–6605 is unconstitutional as applied to his case”) (emphasis added). 
147 State v. Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d 576, 579–582 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14–177. 
148 Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d at 580. 
149 State v. Thomas, 891 So.2d 1233, 1238 (La. 2005); Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d at 
580. The North Carolina Supreme Court has endorsed the approach taken by the court 
of appeals in Whiteley by rejecting an as–applied challenge to the constitutionality of 
the North Carolina crime against nature statute being used to adjudicate a fourteen 
year old boy as delinquent for receiving fellatio from a twelve year old girl even 
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sexual offense, and crimes against nature (all stemming from the same 
alleged offense) but was only convicted on the sodomy charge.150   
On appeal, Whiteley argued that the trial court’s jury instructions as 
to the crime against nature statute violated the Lawrence rule because 
jurors were not informed that the North Carolina sodomy ban should not 
be construed to criminalize consensual nonprocreative intercourse, and 
instead were told that they should return a guilty verdict on the crime 
against nature charge if Whiteley “committed an unnatural sex act.”151  
Although the appellate court found in Whiteley’s favor by holding that as 
applied, his conviction pursuant to the North Carolina sodomy law was in 
error, the case nevertheless illustrates the suboptimality of convicting 
individuals for forcible nonvaginal sex, commercial nonvaginal sex, 
public nonvaginal sex, or nonvaginal sex with minors pursuant to laws that 
facially criminalize all nonvaginal intercourse.152  Perhaps most 
troublingly, Whiteley demonstrates the possibility that laws 
indiscriminately prohibiting sodomy (i.e., criminalizing the sexual 
practice without clear statutory language stipulating the ban only applies 
to forcible sex, etc.) may encourage overzealous prosecutors to obtain 
convictions for crimes against nature as a consolation prize when they fail 
– as the prosecution in Whiteley did – to prove conclusively the necessary 
elements of other, more serious crimes, of which nonprocreative sex is 
also an element.153 
In construing Lawrence as prescribing as-applied inquiries into 
whether prosecutorial and adjudicative choices in a given case do or do 
not target regulable sexual behavior per the exceptions paragraph, states 
permit the continued imposition of criminal sanctions on individuals 
pursuant to statutes which are materially indistinguishable from the Texas 
law characterized by the Supreme Court in Lawrence as invading the 
autonomy of consenting adults over their private sexual lives.154  Refusing 
 
though other state laws regulating sexual behavior do not impose criminal sanctions 
for minors who have sex so long as they are less than three years apart in age solely 
because the case, unlike Lawrence, “does involve minors.” In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 
920, 921–25 (N.C. 2007). 
150 Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d at 578. 
151 Id. at 581. As of at least 2019, the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions 
now cite Whiteley and recommend that courts inform jurors hearing prosecutions for 
crimes against nature that they must find both that the defendant committed an 
“unnatural sex act” and that the activity involved sex with a minor, forcible sex, sex 
for monetary remuneration, or public sex. NORTH CAROLINA CONFERENCE OF 
SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES, NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
CRIMINAL CASES § 226.10A (2019) (Crime against Nature – Persons. G.S. 14-177.). 
152 Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d at 582–583. 
153 See id. at 578. 
154 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). Of course, the Texas 
statute at issue in Lawrence criminalized homosexual sodomy specifically, but the 
Court went to substantial lengths in basing its decision to proscribe the enforcement 
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to interpret Lawrence as facially invalidating statutes that clearly prohibit 
private, consensual, nonprocreative sex (even if the statute is by 
convention or rule no longer applied to such conduct) constructively 
invites entrepreneurial prosecutors to continue charging individuals with 
crimes against nature – in particular, as in Whiteley, when convicting on a 
related offense might prove impracticable – in hopes that courts will be 
sympathetic to their claims that the nonprocreative sex they have chosen 
to prosecute satisfies one of the Lawrence exceptions.155  Further, 
engaging in as-applied challenges to regulations of sodomy necessarily 
demands highly individualized inquiries into the factual circumstances in 
a given case to determine whether or not the behavior is permissibly 
subject to prosecution and conviction per Lawrence.  This vests 
unwarranted discretion in the judiciary to distinguish constitutionally 
worthy claims from frivolous ones, and may even lead to systematic 
inequities should certain classes of defendants become more likely than 
others to prevail on their as-applied challenges to prosecutions for crimes 
against nature.  By contrast, rather than opening a Pandora’s Box of ad hoc 
judicial determinations regarding constitutional merit, parsing Lawrence 
as categorically requiring nonenforcement of statutes that facially 
criminalize conduct including private, consensual, nonprocreative 
intercourse instead places the onus on legislators to enact prohibitory 
statutes whose terms meet the minimum constitutional standards 
associated with substantive due process.156 
D. Collateral Enforcement of Sodomy Laws After Lawrence 
In addition to the direct enforcement of sodomy laws that facially 
criminalize the exact behavior prosecuted in Lawrence v. Texas, some 
states impose collateral burdens on individuals with sodomy convictions 
by making crimes against nature a registrable offense for their state’s sex 
offender registry.157  This includes both direct registration requirements 
for individuals with (pre- and post-Lawrence) in-state sodomy 
convictions, as well as indirect registration requirements for those with 
 
of the Texas law on due process rather than equal protection to clarify that the relevant 
constitutional deficiency was the statute’s interference with private sexual autonomy 
rather than the legal distinction based on sexual identity. See id. 
155 Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d at 578. 
156 See infra Part III–A. 
157 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42–1–12(a)(10)(B)(v) (making it a “dangerous 
criminal offense” for which registration and community notification are required if an 
individual was convicted under § 16–6–2, the provision of the Georgia code making 
it a criminal offense if an individual “performs or submits to any sexual act involving 
the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another,” and precisely the 
statute at issue in Bowers); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23–3–430(C)(11) (making “buggery” a 
registrable offense in South Carolina). 
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out-of-state sodomy convictions via statutory terms that incorporate sex 
offender registration criteria from other states.158  As a result, many 
individuals incur separate, sequential burdens – arrest, trial, incarceration, 
probation, and then registration – based on convictions pursuant to statutes 
that on their face criminally prohibit private, consensual, nonprocreative 
intercourse.159  These collateral consequences create significant 
disruptions in the lives of individuals who – while their actions may be 
consistent with the conduct deemed criminally regulable without violating 
due process by the Supreme Court in Lawrence – were convicted using 
statutory language that facially infringes the constitutional guarantee to 
liberty in one’s private sexual affairs.160 
Any criminal conviction involves collateral consequences.161  Crimes 
that statutorily qualify for sex offender registration, however, impose 
uniquely onerous additional costs on registrants for three reasons.  First, 
sex offense convictions trigger highly emotional reactions among the 
public, and research suggests that the enhancement of punitive 
consequences for sex crimes is rooted in emotional reactions to media 
narratives of crimes involving sex as well as popular overestimation of 
recidivism rates among those convicted of sex offenses.162  Second, federal 
law dictates that sex offense convictions become extraordinarily public 
affairs, as states are required to maintain a registry of individuals convicted 
of sex offenses and to ensure that the information collected from 
individuals convicted of sex offenses is “available on the Internet, in a 
manner that is readily accessible to all jurisdictions and to the public.”163  
 
158 See GA. CODE ANN. § 42–1–12(a)(10)(B)(v) (directly listing sodomy as a 
registrable offense); MISS. CODE ANN §§ 45–33–23(h)(xi), 97–29–59 (making 
“unnatural intercourse” – defined as “the detestable and abominable crime against 
nature committed with mankind or with a beast” – a registrable offense in Mississippi); 
MISS. CODE ANN § 45–33–23(h)(xx) (requiring registration in Mississippi for “[a]ny 
other offense resulting in a conviction in another jurisdiction which, if committed in 
this state, would be deemed to be such a crime without regard to its designation 
elsewhere”). The consequence of the former provision is to make out–of–state sodomy 
convictions registrable in Mississippi even if they were not registrable in the state of 
conviction. MISS. CODE ANN §§ 45–33–23(h)(xi), 97–29–59. 
159 See generally MISS. CODE ANN §§ 45–33–23(h)(xi), 97–29–59; GA. CODE 
ANN. § 42–1–12(a)(10)(B)(v); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23–3–430(C)(11); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 14–177; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18–6605; LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:89(A)(2) (2006). 
160 See infra notes 162–67 and accompanying text. 
161 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Olivares, et al., The Collateral Consequences of a 
Felony Conviction: A National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. 
PROB. 10, 10 (1996) (examining the manner in which state criminal codes create 
collateral costs for those convicted of felonies). 
162 James F. Quinn et al., Societal Reaction to Sex Offenders: A Review of the 
Origins and Results of the Myths Surrounding Their Crimes and Treatment 
Amenability, 25 DEVIANT BEHAV. 215, 217–226 (2004). 
163 34 U.S.C. § 20912(a). The federal statute governing registration for 
individuals convicted of sex offenses – known colloquially as the Sex Offender 
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Third, the period during which registration is compulsory for those 
convicted of sex offenses can last from fifteen years to the remainder of 
the individual’s life.164  Likely as a result of the distinct burden associated 
with sex offense convictions, research demonstrates that individuals 
convicted of sex offenses and required to register experience a host of 
negative collateral consequences in their lives.165  In a 2005 survey of 
persons with sex offense convictions, at least one fifth of respondents 
reported that they experienced either the loss of their job, denial of a 
promotion at work, loss or denial of a place to live, being treated rudely in 
a public place, having lost a friend who found out about their registration, 
being harassed in person, or receiving harassing or threatening telephone 
calls or emails as a result of their registration status.166  This litany of 
ancillary ramifications associated with sex offender registration and 
notification presents significant barriers to the social and psychological 
reintegration of individuals convicted of sex offenses into the community 
after their incarceration.167 
 
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) – punishes noncompliance with a ten 
percent reduction in Byrne grants to the state. Id. § 20927(a) (establishing the 
information to be collected from individuals convicted of sex offenses and included 
in the state registry). Jurisdictions are required to exempt from disclosure the identity 
of sex offense victims, the social security number of individuals convicted of sex 
offenses, and information regarding arrests of individuals convicted of sex offenses 
that did not lead to convictions and are given the option to exempt other information 
such as the employer and educational institution of individuals convicted of sex 
offenses. Id. § 20920(b)–(c). 
164 Id. § 20915(a) (delineating that the required registration period for those 
convicted of sex offenses differs based on whether they are classified as having 
committed a Tier I, Tier II, or Tier III offense, in escalating order of seriousness). 
Individuals convicted of sex offenses and required to register pursuant to SORNA can 
reduce their required registration period if they maintain what the statute calls a “clean 
record.” Id. § 20915(b). 
165 See Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Consequences of Sex Offender 
Registration, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 67, 74–78 (2005). 
166 Id. at 75. For some of the items on the survey – loss of job, loss or denial of 
a place to live, having lost friends, and being harassed in person – the proportion of 
respondents who reported such negative experiences was nearly or greater than one 
half, and over ten percent of respondents reported having been assaulted or asked to 
leave a business as a result of their registration status. Id. These survey results were 
largely replicated in subsequent qualitative research, as well. Richard Tewksbury & 
Matthew Lees, Perceptions of Sex Offender Registration: Collateral Consequences 
and Community Experiences, 26 SOC. SPECTRUM 309, 331 (2006). Research also 
suggests negative emotional consequences for the family members of individuals 
convicted of sex offenses due to the registration and community notification 
requirements. Richard G. Zevitz et al., Sex Offender Community Notification: 
Managing High Risk Criminals or Exacting Further Vengeance?, 18 BEHAV. SCI. L. 
375, 381 (2000). 
167 See id. 
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States violate the Lawrence rule by collaterally sanctioning 
individuals convicted pursuant to statutes facially criminalizing private, 
consensual sodomy through sex offender registration and notification 
requirements.  Likewise – as illustrated in ongoing litigation surrounding 
Mississippi’s requirement that individuals convicted of sodomy register as 
sex offenders – procedural rules governing eligibility for post-conviction 
relief have the potential to thwart legal attempts to obtain judicial 
exemption of persons convicted under laws facially criminalizing sodomy 
from the registration requirement.168  In Doe v. Hood, Arthur Doe sought 
to challenge his inclusion on the Mississippi sex offender registry (MSOR) 
based on his 1977 conviction pursuant to the state’s law criminalizing 
“unnatural intercourse.”169  While a federal district court agreed that the 
unnatural intercourse statute “appears to be unconstitutional” and that Doe 
“should not be subjected to the stigmatizing requirements imposed by the 
MSOR,” the court deferred judgment on the constitutionality of the statute 
until a state court determines whether Doe is barred from relief since he 
has not met the requirement that his original prosecution conclude through 
a favorable determination under the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Heck v. Humphrey.170 The outcome for Arthur Doe, then, turns 
on whether Mississippi courts agree with the state that Doe has an avenue 
for habeas relief in state courts via the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral 
Relief Act, in which case federal claims related to his prosecution and 
conviction would be barred by Heck pending the outcome of a state appeal 
for post-conviction relief.171 Individuals convicted pursuant to 
presumptively unconstitutional sodomy bans and forced to register as sex 
offenders thus face a daunting procedural obstacle to receiving exemptions 
from registration and notification requirements as the prospect of a Heck 
bar precluding their claim significantly deters affected parties from 
seeking relief. 
 
168 Doe v. Hood, 345 F. Supp. 3d 749, 754–756 (S.D. Miss. 2018). 
169 Id. at 750–51; MISS. CODE ANN. § 97–29–59. 
170 Hood, 345 F. Supp. 3d at 751–756; Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–
487 (1994). There is a prodigious amount of legal scholarship criticizing Heck on 
various grounds, including negative evaluations of the favorable termination rule for 
creating unreasonable complications if individuals incarcerated in state prisons seek 
post–conviction relief (typically via 42 U.S.C. § 1983) but lack access to habeas relief. 
See Note, Defining the Reach of Heck v. Humphrey: Should the Favorable 
Termination Rule Apply to Individuals Who Lack Access to Habeas Corpus?, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 868, 889 (2008) (arguing that federal claims should not be barred for 
imprisoned persons in state courts if they are unable to pursue state habeas relief). 
171 Hood, 345 F. Supp. 3d at 755–56; MISS. CODE ANN. § 99–39–5 (2013). 
Specifically, the Mississippi statute governing post–conviction relief demands that 
motions for post–conviction relief after a guilty plea (as in Doe’s case) be filed within 
three years after a conviction is entered, but the state supreme court has exempted 
claims regarding fundamental rights from this procedural limitation. Id. § 99–39–5(2); 
Rowland v. State, 42 So.3d 503, 508 (Miss. 2010). 
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Other states employ similar statutory measures to target conduct 
involving consensual, nonprocreative intercourse for particular 
condemnation and interpose the state judiciary to arbitrate claims by 
individuals seeking exemption from state sex offender registration 
requirements.  Until 2010, Louisiana made the solicitation of anal or oral 
sex a registrable offense (crime against nature by solicitation), but did not 
require registration for the solicitation of vaginal intercourse (chargeable 
only under the state’s prostitution statute).172  In Doe v. Jindal, the court 
for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that the state’s practice of having 
“created two classifications of similarly (in fact, identical) situated 
individuals who were treated differently (only one class is subject to 
mandatory sex offender registration)” bore “no rational relation to any 
legitimate government objective,” and thus failed rational basis review.173  
Though this prohibition involved commercial sex – approved for 
regulation by Lawrence’s exceptions paragraph – the case is instructive 
for discerning the state’s attitude toward oral and anal sex versus vaginal 
intercourse and the differential rationale for making solicitation of one a 
registrable offense versus the other.  In Doe, the state attempted to justify 
its enhanced treatment of crimes against nature by solicitation versus 
prostitution “because Crime Against Nature by Solicitation is a lesser 
offense to which other registrable offenses can be pleaded down to.”174 
This argument, which, among other things, traffics in the dissemination of 
hackneyed stereotypes about same-sex intimacy and AIDS and was 
characterized as “patent hypothetical speculation” by the Court in Doe, 
does not persuasively justify the state’s preferred policy of punishing 
conduct involving nonprocreative intercourse more stringently than 
vaginal sex.175 
Although the Louisiana state legislature amended its statutory 
framework governing registration after Doe v. Jindal to allow individuals 
convicted of a crime against nature by solicitation to petition for relief 
from registration and notification requirements, the current registration 
statute nevertheless subjects the decision whether to grant such petitioners 
relief to a judge in the court where those individuals were originally 
convicted.176  Thus, after differentially burdening individuals convicted for 
solicitation of nonvaginal sex for years after Lawrence– rather than 
automatically rescinding the registration and notification requirement for 
 
172 Doe v. Jindal, 851 F. Supp. 2d 995, 998–99 (E.D. La. 2012). 
173 Id. at 1007. 
174 Id. at 1008. 
175 See, e.g., Celia Kitzinger & Elizabeth Peel, The De–Gaying and Re–Gaying 
of AIDS: Contested Homophobias in Lesbian and Gay Awareness Training, 16 
DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 173, 177 (2005) (discussing the historical tendency of associating 
HIV/AIDS with gay sex practices and of portraying “gay men…as a dangerous threat 
to public safety”). 
176 LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:542(F)(3)(a). 
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individuals convicted of a crime against nature by solicitation prior to the 
statutory equalization between solicitation of vaginal and nonvaginal 
intercourse – the Louisiana code now places the responsibility on 
convicted persons themselves to petition for relief.177  This burden not only 
extends to Louisiana residents with convictions for crimes against nature 
by solicitation, but also levies convoluted obligations on individuals who 
move to another state after a conviction for crimes against nature by 
solicitation in Louisiana and must then petition for deregistration in their 
new home state.178 
Precise, systematic data on the number of registrants per state who 
have registered as sex offenders due to a sodomy conviction are hard to 
come by due to significant non-transparent registry data in some states.179  
Although Mississippi does not offer a comprehensive database of 
registered sex offenders online,180 the Court in Doe v. Hood noted that 
“[a]pproximately 35 Mississippi residents have convictions for Unnatural 
Intercourse or an out-of-state statute that criminalizes oral or anal sex with 
no additional elements” and that “[o]f these, about 22 individuals are 
registered on the MSOR.”181  Georgia, however, both requires individuals 
 
177 See id. 
178 See Doe v. Hood, 345 F. Supp. 3d 749, 751–52 (S.D. Miss. 2018) (describing 
the process by which a class of individuals convicted for crimes against nature by 
solicitation in Louisiana eventually reached an agreement with the state in Doe v. 
Hood to have themselves and other individuals with Louisiana “CANS” convictions 
removed from the Mississippi sex offender registry). 
179 See, e.g., Sex Offender Registry, ALA. L. ENF’T AGENCY, 
https://www.alea.gov/node/270 [https://perma.cc/3K4H-7PRY] (last visited February 
5, 2021) (allowing users to search for registered offenders by address, name, city, 
compliance status, or email address, but neither allowing users to search for registered 
offenders by convicted offense nor supplying a downloadable file with all offenders 
by state). A representative from the ALEA confirmed by email that the agency does 
not provide a statewide list of registrants without a formal records request. E-mail 
from ALEA Rep. to Jordan Carr Peterson, Assistant Professor Pol. Sci., Sch. Pub. & 
Int’l Affs., N.C. State U. (Oct. 27, 2020) (on file with author); E-mail from ALEA 
Rep. to Jordan Carr Peterson, Assistant Professor Pol. Sci., Sch. Pub. & Int’l Affs., 
N.C. State U. (Oct. 28, 2020) (on file with author). In some other states that continue 
to enforce facial criminal prohibitions on crimes against nature against individuals 
who engage in behavior from the exceptions paragraph in Lawrence, a sodomy 
conviction is not registrable. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–208.6(5) (delineating the 
registrable “sexually violent offense[s]” which include rape, sexual battery, sexual 
exploitation of a minor, and incest, among others, but exclude crimes against nature, 
despite sodomy remaining a criminal offense in the state). 
180 See Mississippi Sex Offender Registry, STATE OF MISS. DEPT. OF PUB. 
SAFETY, http://state.sor.dps.ms.gov/SearchOffender.aspx [https://perma.cc/YT99-
48UJ] (last visited February 5, 2021) (allowing users to search for individuals on the 
MSOR by name, within a geographic radius around an address or zip code, or in a 
given county). 
181 Hood, 345 F. Supp. 3d at 753. 
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convicted of sodomy to register as sex offenders182 and makes its sex 
offender registry publicly available online in its entirety.183  Data from the 
Georgia Sex Offender Registry indicate that over 250 individuals are 
registered as sex offenders in the state due to a sodomy conviction, and 
that at least one person in ninety of Georgia’s 189 counties is registered as 
a sex offender stemming from a sodomy conviction.184  Of these 
individuals, nearly three quarters (73.5%) were convicted for sodomy 
within Georgia, whereas the remainder (26.5%) were convicted of sodomy 
or its equivalent out of state but nevertheless required to register in 
Georgia, including states such as Maryland, New York, and Virginia, in 
which laws facially criminalizing sodomy have been repealed.185  In the 
figure below, I present a graphical representation of the Georgia sex 
offender registry data that reflects the individuals listed on the Georgia 
registry based on sodomy. Convictions are not racially representative of 
either the registry or the overall state population.186  Among those on the 
registry for sodomy, 50.2% were reported as White, whereas 49.8% were 
reported as Black. This suggests Black individuals are overrepresented 
among sodomy registrants in Georgia compared to their share of the 
broader population in the state and the total population on the registry: 
statewide, Georgia is 57.8% White and 31.9% Black, and among 
 
182 GA. CODE ANN. § 42–1–12(a)(10)(B)(v). 
183 See Georgia Sex Offender Registry, GA. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
https://gbi.georgia.gov/services/georgia-sex-offender-registry 
[https://perma.cc/NWU2-GLYK] (last visited February 5, 2021). 
184 Id. The nomenclature for the sodomy convictions in the Georgia registry is 
somewhat inconsistent, but 257 of the crimes listed in the database and for which 
individuals have currently registered as sex offenders contain the word “sodomy” or 
its statutory equivalent. Id. This includes 35 registrants whose crime is listed as 
“Sodomy,” 171 registrants whose crime is listed as “Sodomy – Felony,” and scattered 
other offenses that either specify the degree of the crime in one of various forms (e.g., 
“Sodomy 1st,” “Sodomy 1st Deg,” “Sodomy 1st Degree,” “Sodomy I,” etc.), contain 
two offenses (e.g., “Sodomy Kidnapping,” “Sodomy Sexual Assault,” etc.), or go by 
a different name entirely (“crimes against nature,” as this is the statutory offense in 
Louisiana, where two of the convictions occurred). Id. Since the Georgia database 
does not supply the statute pursuant to which individuals were convicted, it is 
impossible to discern much more about the circumstances giving rise to the offenses 
coded “Sodomy” or “Sodomy – Felony.” Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. Of the more than 23,000 individuals listed on the registry, all but 182 were 
reported as being either Black or White. Id. These 182 individuals of other races are 
included in the denominator to calculate the percentages appearing in the figure, but I 
do not present percentage data broken out by offense for other races due to the small 
subsample. Id. 
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individuals registered as sex offenders, 53.5% are White and 45.7% are 
Black.  
 
Figure: Racial Makeup of Georgia Sex Offender Registry 
The vertical bars indicate the proportion of individuals who are White 
or Black (1) statewide according to the 2019 Census estimate; (2) on 
the sex offender registry (SOR); (3) among individuals with sodomy 
convictions on the SOR; (4) among individuals with child molestation 
convictions on the SOR; and (5) with computer pornography 
convictions on the SOR, all as of February 2021. 
Individuals on the Georgia sex offender registry with sodomy 
convictions reported as Black are also overrepresented compared with the 
individuals compelled to register due to convictions for child molestation 
or computer pornography, among whom 39.9% and 14.4% were reported 
as Black, respectively. 
Though the data presented here represent only an exploratory glimpse 
at the state of sex offender registration in Georgia, these descriptive 
findings indicate that Black individuals in the state make up a 
disproportionate share of individuals on the sex offender registry 
altogether, as well as a disproportionate share of individuals registered as 
sex offenders due to sodomy convictions.187  These racial disparities 
 
187 These data are, of course, consistent with broader, prominent scholarly 
narratives regarding mass incarceration as a tool of racial oppression. See generally 
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (suggesting that “tough–on–crime” policies, in particular 
those initiated by the Nixon and Reagan administrations, have had profound and 
disproportionately negative effects on Black Americans). 
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suggest that there may be significant social inequities perpetuated by the 
implementation of sex offender registration and notification requirements, 
and future scholarship would do well to examine these inequities 
systematically. This, alongside the procedural impediments for individuals 
with sodomy convictions seeking deregistration discussed earlier, suggests 
that the continued imposition of sex offender registration and notification 
requirements on individuals convicted pursuant to statutes facially 
criminalizing consensual sodomy is by no means a trivial burden.  Rather, 
the requirement that individuals with convictions under consensual 
sodomy bans register as sex offenders is at best constitutionally suspect as 
it represents the collateral enforcement of a public policy deemed 
unconstitutional in Lawrence.188  Furthermore, at this juncture, scholars 
remain unable to estimate precisely the scope of the deprivations occurring 
through such registration and notification requirements due to widespread 
unavailability of comprehensive sex offender registry data as well as the 
tendency of such requirements to evade review through procedural 
constraints on post-conviction relief.189 
E. Sodomy Laws and the Persistence of Stigmatization  
Even in the absence of direct or collateral enforcement, the presence 
of laws criminalizing private, consensual, nonprocreative intercourse on 
American statute books advances a retrograde conception of gay men and 
lesbians as a criminal class.190  Well before Lawrence was decided, 
scholars recognized the employment of criminal prohibitions on sodomy 
as a means through which the state could enshrine the social otherness of 
gay men and lesbians in law.191 Criminalizing the modal form of sex for 
gay men already cast a long shadow of opprobrium on a marginalized 
population when such statutes were considered constitutionally sound.192  
Indeed, among the most persuasive explanations for the sweeping 
language in the Lawrence decision is that “the very fact of criminalization, 
even unaccompanied by any appreciable number of prosecutions, can cast 
already misunderstood or despised individuals into grossly stereotyped 
roles, which become the source and justification for treating those 
 
188 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003). 
189 See HARV. L. REV. supra note 170, at 875. 
190 See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by 
“Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 103, 112–13 (2000) 
(describing the function of laws criminalizing sodomy as establishing a formal sexual 
hierarchy in which gay men and lesbians are a criminal class). 
191 See id. at 114 (“The symbolic function of sodomy laws is similar to Jim Crow 
laws in that a primary purpose of both types of law is to condemn an entire class of 
Americans as immoral, inferior, and not deserving of society’s tolerance and 
protection.”). 
192 See id. 
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individuals less well than others.”193  Even today, nearly twenty years after 
Lawrence, some states refuse to repeal statutes indiscriminately 
criminalizing sodomy under a constitutional regime that maintains 
“[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that 
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons 
to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”194  It is 
exceedingly difficult to justify the decision to let private, consensual 
sodomy remain a criminal offense per the terms of state law if the statutes 
serve little purpose other than recreational stigmatization. 
Moreover, law is an expression of public values, and it bears 
consideration exactly which values criminal prohibitions on sodomy 
advance.195  Statutes criminalizing sodomy – even if entirely unenforced – 
represent the formalization of public contempt for the sexual practices 
most common among a minority subgroup of the population whose youth 
regularly experience verbal harassment, physical assault, or rejection by 
their families,196 and are nearly five times as likely to commit and attempt 
suicide.197  Speaking after the repeal of his state’s crimes against nature 
statute in 2014, gay Virginia State Senator Adam Ebbin cast his chamber’s 
unanimous decision to abandon the discriminatory and sexually restrictive 
policy in terms that demonstrate he understood the public values 
undergirding repeal: “The law was a terrible, symbolic insult … Once the 
governor signs it, I am glad that all consenting adults will finally be treated 
as adults.”198  Although the preceding subsections of this Article establish 
with certainty that laws facially proscribing sodomy are still directly and 
collaterally enforced, even unenforced regulations of private, consensual, 
nonprocreative intercourse would further no ends other than the continued 
stigmatization of all individuals who engage in same-sex intimacy.199 
 
193 Tribe, supra note 49 at 1896. 
194 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
195 William J. Hall, Psychosocial Risk and Protective Factors for Depression 
Among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Queer Youth: A Systematic Review, 65 J. 
HOMOSEXUALITY 263, 264–65 (2018). 
196 Id. 
197 Zachary Giano, et al., Identifying Distinct Subgroups of Lesbian, Gay, and 
Bisexual Youth for Suicide Risk: A Latent Profile Analysis, 67 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 
194, 194 (2020). 
198 Lou Chibbaro Jr., Va. Lawmakers Repeal Sodomy Ban in Unanimous Vote, 
WASH. BLADE (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonblade.com/2014/03/07/va-
lawmakers-repeal-sodomy-ban-unanimous-vote/ [https://perma.cc/7Q57-QPUE]. 
199 Ragusa & Birkhead, see e.g., supra note 2, at 745. 
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IV. PATHS FORWARD: HARMONIZING POLICY WITH THE LETTER 
AND SPIRIT OF LAWRENCE 
A. Legislative Remedies 
The simplest solution to criminal prohibitions on sodomy lingering 
in state codes is for state legislatures to repeal the prohibitory statutes. This 
has already been accomplished in a handful of states that continued to have 
enforceable sodomy bans at the time Lawrence was decided, as detailed in 
Part II-B above,200 and repeal is well within the powers of those state 
legislatures in jurisdictions that continue to enforce statutory prohibitions 
on sodomy despite the constitutional shadow looming over such laws.201  
For reasons I discuss subsequently, however, legislative repeal of sodomy 
laws represents a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ensuring the 
entire footprint of criminal prohibitions on consensual sexual behavior is 
erased due to regimes of collateral enforcement that burden individual 
liberty based on sodomy convictions indirectly. 
Repeal has several advantages over judicial action.  First, legislative 
repeal lends democratic legitimacy to the decriminalization of consensual 
sexual behavior.  Repeal sends an unequivocal signal from the branch of 
government with the lawmaking prerogative in a separation of powers 
framework that the state has no intention of imposing criminal sanctions 
on individuals for their private, consensual sexual conduct.  Second, 
legislative repeal would, in all likelihood, accelerate the decriminalization 
of sodomy as state legislatures have the capacity to remove statutory 
prohibitions from their state’s code effective immediately.  This stands in 
contrast to the piecemeal abandonment of legislation criminalizing 
sodomy after Lawrence, which has resulted in the patchwork quilt of 
(non)compliance conditions across the country and which has continued 
to prove so catastrophic for individuals who engage in sexual conduct 
prosecuted under sodomy bans.202  Further, in addition to ending direct 
enforcement, repeal would swiftly contribute to reducing the 
stigmatization of same-sex sexual intimacy described in Part II-E.  Third, 
legislative repeal of sodomy prohibitions can end the criminalization of 
consensual sexual behavior with finality.  Since legislation – unlike a 
judicial decision – does not grant dissatisfied parties the right to appeal or 
use other dilatory tactics to avoid compliance, a legislative determination 
 
200 See supra Part II-B. 
201 See e.g., Staff Reports, Md. sodomy law officially repealed, WASH. BLADE 
(October 1, 2020) https://www.washingtonblade.com/2020/10/01/md-sodomy-law-
officially-repealed/ [https://perma.cc/3DSV-VVGC]. 
202 See supra notes 89–102 (listing states which have not repealed sodomy laws). 
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to cease the criminal prohibition of sodomy would likely represent the 
final word on the subject.203 
Legislative repeal of sodomy prohibitions is an important step toward 
ensuring the public policy of regulating sexual behavior becomes more 
consistent with the letter and spirit of the Lawrence holding.  Legislation 
repealing sodomy bans, however, is on its own insufficient because simply 
repealing an existing prohibition fails to remedy inequities in the justice 
system stemming from collateral enforcement as described in Part II, 
subpart D above.204  In particular, a repeal bill on its own would fail to end 
the practice of requiring that individuals convicted pursuant to statutes 
criminalizing sodomy prior to repeal to register as sex offenders.205  State 
legislatures, then, should also enact legislation unambiguously 
establishing that the state forbids its justice department from requiring 
individuals to register with their state’s sex offender registry due to 
convictions for sodomy or crimes against nature, and specifying that 
individuals are not required to register as sex offenders whether the 
sodomy convictions occurred in state or out of state, and whether their 
convictions were before or after Lawrence.  Legislation should also 
retroactively deregister any individuals with convictions pursuant to 
categorical sodomy bans rather than placing the burden to deregister on 
registrants themselves.206 This legislative modification of qualifying 
offenses to state sex offender registries is a necessary additional step 
toward guaranteeing that both direct and collateral enforcement of statutes 
prohibiting sodomy come to an end. 
 
203 The Legislative Process, U.S. H.R., https://www.house.gov/the-house-
explained/the-legislative-process [https://perma.cc/LT8H-H4VK] (last visited May 
19, 2021).  The sole exceptions to this claim would be if either (1) repeal legislation 
delayed or deferred decriminalization for any reason; or (2) a group of legislators 
elected subsequent to the repeal of a sodomy ban made the choice to recriminalize 
sodomy via a new statute. Getting Rid of Sodomy Laws: History and Strategy That 
Led to the Lawrence Decision, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/getting-rid-
sodomy-laws-history-and-strategy-led-lawrence-decision [https://perma.cc/LX5S-
RR5J] (last visited May 19, 2021). The political logic behind the first possibility is 
unclear, and I do not believe such hypothetical legislation would be properly classified 
as a repeal bill in any event. The second possibility seems unlikely for legislators 
concerned with the reelection imperative given the political unpopularity of 
criminalizing sodomy according to a series of public opinion polls conducted by 
Gallup, in which a majority of respondents have not supported making consensual gay 
or lesbian sex illegal since the late 1980s, and in whose most recent wave fully 72 
percent of respondents oppose the criminalization of gay sex. Gay and Lesbian Rights, 
GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay–lesbian–rights.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/R4W6-PYZ9] (last visited January 30, 2021). 
204 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003). 
205 See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 163–67. 
206 See e.g., Georgia Sex Offender Registry, supra note 183. 
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B. Judicial Remedies 
While legislative actions to repeal statutory sodomy prohibitions and 
prevent collateral enforcement of sodomy regulations are the most 
straightforward solution to the enduring afterlife of criminal prohibitions 
on sodomy, the judiciary can also act to alleviate the burden on those 
deprived of rights and liberties in violation of Lawrence.207  Namely, 
courts should interpret the Lawrence decision at its word, and maintain 
that the criminal regulation of consensual sodomy facially violates the 
constitutional guarantee to substantive due process.208  Should the 
opportunity arise, the Supreme Court itself could articulate that Lawrence 
facially invalidated the Texas homosexual conduct law and mandate the 
nonenforcement of statutes criminalizing private, consensual sodomy.209  
This leaves in place regulations specifically enumerating only those sorts 
of practices deemed constitutionally eligible for criminal prohibitions in 
the exceptions paragraph, but forces states only to charge and convict 
pursuant to legislation that cannot be read to impose criminal sanctions for 
private, consensual, nonprocreative intercourse.210  Likewise, the Court 
could read Lawrence as prohibiting not only the direct enforcement of 
criminal prohibitions on sodomy, but also the indirect enforcement via sex 
offender registration and notification requirements.211  To accomplish the 
latter, the Court need simply interpret the Lawrence holding as proscribing 
the imposition of any criminal or administrative burden, including but not 
limited to direct prosecution as well as the onerous demands associated 
with sex offender registration detailed in Part II, subpart D above.212  
Although the implementation of a holding along these lines might involve 
the same sorts of complications described in Part II, subpart A due to 
judicial passivity and decentralized political authority, a judicial 
reimagining of Lawrence that clarifies the operative scope of the holding 
as rendering laws indiscriminately criminalizing nonprocreative sexual 
intercourse constitutionally intolerable could substantially reduce the 
semantic ambiguity associated with the original decision and thus leave 
far less discretion for those implementing the holding to evade its 
requirements. 
 
207 See e.g., Williams v. State, 184 So. 3d 1064, 1067 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). 
208 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599. 
209 Homosexuality and the Constitution: A Legal Analysis of the Supreme Court 
Ruling in Lawrence v. Texas, EVERYCRSREPORT.COM (May 26, 2005) 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL31681.html#TOC2_7 
[https://perma.cc/ZJ9V-27JB]. 
210 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
211 See e.g., id. at 578–79 (describing broad implications and protections against 
state sodomy laws as violating the Due Process Clauses of Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
212 Id. (explaining a broad protection provided by the Due Process Clauses). 
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In addition to action in the appellate judiciary, trial courts also have 
the capacity to minimize avoidance of the Lawrence rule in states where 
prosecutors seek to continue charging and convicting individuals pursuant 
to statutes criminalizing sodomy.213  In particular, trial courts could 
exercise their equitable discretion to enter permanent injunctive relief 
requiring nonenforcement of any statutes that could be read to impose 
criminal sanctions for private, consensual, nonprocreative sexual 
intercourse.214  Likewise, either state or federal courts could enjoin state 
departments of justice from requiring individuals with sodomy convictions 
to register as sex offenders as doing so imposes a burden prohibited by 
Lawrence. 
For the reasons discussed earlier, I believe legislative efforts to 
harmonize state policies with the letter and spirit of the Lawrence decision 
would provide the most efficacious solution to the persistence of sodomy 
regulations.215  It may be, however, that certain state legislatures 
demonstrate little interest in (or actively oppose) formally decriminalizing 
private, consensual, nonprocreative sexual intercourse within their 
jurisdictions. For instance, the Louisiana House of Representatives 
rejected a bill in 2014 that would have removed consensual, same-sex 
intercourse from their state code’s list of crimes against nature by a vote 
of 66 to 27.216  In such cases of legislative intransigence, courts offer a 
secondary venue in which litigants have the capacity to press for 
modifications their legislatures are unwilling to grant. 
 
213 How Courts Work, AM. BAR ASSOC., 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_educat
ion_network/how_courts_work/pretrial_appearances/ [https://perma.cc/E2DD-
NQMF] (last visited May 19, 2021). 
214 See Weinberger v. Romero–Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (holding 
courts are afforded the power to grant the “extraordinary” equitable remedy of a 
permanent prohibitory injunctions in the event litigation involves an “irreparable 
injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies”). The scholarly literature criticizing the 
employment of universal injunctions by federal district courts is vast and the debate 
over such remedies lies outside the scope of this Article. See Samuel L. Bray, Multiple 
Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 418, 419 (2017) 
(arguing injunctive relief should not bind groups or individuals outside the parties to 
specific litigation); but see Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1088–99 (2018) (contending that in some cases nationwide 
injunctions are the sole means by which courts can provide plaintiffs with complete 
relief and ensure parties situated similarly to the plaintiff are not unduly harmed). 
215 See supra Part III–A. 
216 CRIME: Amends crime against nature and aggravated crime against nature 
relative to certain provisions held to be unconstitutional, H.B. 12, Louisiana House of 
Representatives (2014); HBS Final Passage Roll Call Vote, Louisiana House of 
Representatives (2014) (indicating that 67 members of the state house rejected H.B. 
12, 27 members voted in favor, and 11 were absent or abstained). 
44
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss3/7
2021] THE CRIMINAL REGULATION OF SODOMY 901 
V. CONCLUSION 
The criminal regulation of sodomy is rooted in centuries of 
homophobia, and it survives today.217 Although the Lawrence decision 
maintained – in no uncertain terms – that laws facially criminalizing 
sodomy burdened fundamental constitutional rights, linguistic imprecision 
in the decision afforded pro-enforcement proponents sufficient latitude to 
prop up a zombie regime of presumptively unconstitutional statutes.218  
Likewise, the stubborn persistence of criminal prohibitions on sodomy via 
both direct and collateral enforcement draws attention to the inherent 
challenges for effective implementation of judicial decisions in American 
government.219  The deliberate fragmentation of political authority serves 
important public interests,220 but permits – or even invites – 
noncompliance given dedicated and geographically concentrated 
resistance. Lawrence, then, left unfinished business in its wake. 
The continued enforcement of laws facially criminalizing sodomy 
proceeds by claiming that Lawrence only demands judicial interference 
with sodomy convictions if such statutes have been enforced against 
private, consensual sexual activity between adults, regardless how 
narrowly the statutory terms are drawn.221  This claim rests on the implicit 
assumption that society can trust law enforcement, prosecutors, and 
judicial officials to decide equitably that the application of categorical 
sodomy bans does not burden the constitutional guarantee to liberty.222  In 
light of well-documented limitations on the promotion of sexual freedom 
and gay rights by both courts and law enforcement in the past, this 
assumption is ill-advised.223  Rather than placing our collective faith in the 
equitable enforcement of statutes that criminalize private, consensual, 
nonprocreative sex on their face, Lawrence demands the nonenforcement 
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218 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003). 
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surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; 
and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct 
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221 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189–90 (1986). 
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223 Id. at 190–91; see, e.g., Kristina B. Wolff & Carrie L. Cokely, “To Protect 
and to Serve?: An Exploration of Police Conduct in Relation to the Gay, Lesbian, 
Bisexual, and Transgender Community, 11 SEXUALITY & CULTURE 1, 9–21 (2007) 
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incident reports with the Minneapolis police); Jared Leighton, “All of Us Are 
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of such laws regardless of the conduct enforcement is intended to target.224  
To maintain the direct enforcement of laws facially criminalizing sodomy, 
as well as the imposition of collateral consequences for sodomy 
convictions through mandatory registration and notification in a public 
repository intended to deter violent sex crimes, is constitutionally 
unsustainable as continued application of such laws is inconsistent with 
the most rudimentary conception of individual liberty.225  Legislative 
repeal of statutes facially criminalizing sodomy coupled with appropriate 
reforms of statutory sex offender registration requirements represents the 
most effective means to finish, finally, what Lawrence started. 
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